TRANSPERSONAL ECOLOGY:
"PSYCHOLOGIZING" ECOPHILOSOPHY

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PSYCHOLOGIZING ECOPHILOSOPHY

Transpersonal ecology—the idea of the this-worldly realization of as expansive a sense of self as possible—refers to a psychologically based approach to ecophilosophical problems. This idea raises the interesting question of how we might conceive of the most widely recognized approaches to ecophilosophy (i.e., instrumental and intrinsic value theory approaches) in psychological rather than axiological (i.e., value theory) terms. It is illuminating to approach this question by considering a well-known and apparently widely accepted way of conceiving of human psychology or the self.

There is much theoretical and popular support for a dynamic, tripartite conception of the self. Specifically, most of us recognize a desiring-impulsive aspect of the self, a rationalizing-deciding aspect, and a normative-judgmental aspect. In fact, unless we are exceptionally well integrated, it is often more appropriate to speak not so much of three aspects of the self but rather of three selves. Thus, we can speak of a desiring-impulsive self, a rationalizing-deciding self, and a normative-judgmental self. It should of course be noted that these labels simply refer to hypothetical constructs. The validity of these constructs rests upon their usefulness in both describing certain recognizable systems of thought and behavior and illuminating the dynamics between these systems (see Rowan, 1989).

The desiring-impulsive self wants much (the desiring aspect) and wants it now (the impulsive aspect). This means that it

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functions without particular regard for others, the future, or the constraints that are imposed by reality in general. The normative-judgmental self sets standards or expectations on our behavior, whether in the moral sphere, where it decrees what ought to be and demands conformance with a certain code of conduct, or in other spheres of activity, where it also expects the attainment of certain standards of performance. It judges "us" (the other aspects of our self-or our other selves) critically if we fall short of its standards or expectations. The rationalizing-deciding self sees itself as the decision maker or the locus of control with respect to the three selves. This means that it mediates between the competing demands of the desiring-impulsive self, the normative-judgmental self, and the constraints that are imposed by reality.

This general kind of dynamic, tripartite conception of the self finds popular support in the pre-Darwinian and pre-Freudian distinctions that people commonly used to make (and to some extent still do make) between their lower, also called animal or primitive, nature (i.e., their desiring-impulsive self), their rational nature (i.e., their rationalizing-deciding self), and their higher nature or conscience (i.e., their normative-judgmental self). This tripartite conception also finds theoretical support in more rigorous, psychological analyses of the self, which (in the West) is to say in Freudian and post-Freudian psychology. For example, the tripartite conception I have outlined has strong parallels with Freud's division of the personality into id, ego, and superego. Indeed, my characterization of the rationalizing-deciding self as the self that mediates between the competing demands of the desiring-impulsive self, the normative-judgmental self, and the constraints that are imposed by reality represents a more or less textbook definition of the Freudian ego. In terms of more recent psychotherapeutic approaches, this tripartite conception also has strong parallels, for example, with the division that is made in transactional analysis—not to be confused with transpersonal approaches—between childlike, adultlike, and parentlike aspects of the personality (transactional analysts refer to these aspects of the personality simply as child, adult, and parent).

When we attempt to conceptualize the instrumental and intrinsic value theory approaches in psychological rather than axiological terms, we find a compelling correspondence between these approaches and the well-known and obviously useful tripartite conception of the self that I have just outlined. Specifically, the kind of self that is emphasized in regard to our relations with the nonhuman world in the unrestrained exploitation and expansionism approach is the desiring-impulsive, "primitive," id-like, or childlike self, which func-
tions without particular regard for others, the future, or the constraints that are imposed by reality in general; the kind of self that is emphasized in regard to our relations with the nonhuman world in the resource conservation and development and resource preservation approaches is the rationalizing-deciding, "rational," (Freudian) ego-like, or adult-like self, which mediates between the competing demands of the desiring-impulsive self, the normative-judgmental self, and the constraints that are imposed by reality; and the kind of self that is emphasized in regard to our relations with the nonhuman world in intrinsic value theory approaches in general is the normative-judgmental, "higher," superego-like, or parent-like self, which inter alia decrees what ought to be and demands conformance with a certain code of conduct.

The correspondence between the desiring-impulsive self and the unrestrained exploitation and expansionism approach is so obvious as not to stand in need of further comment. However, I will expand in turn upon the correspondence that applies between the rationalizing-deciding self and the resource conservation and development and resource preservation approaches on the one hand and the normative-judgmental self and intrinsic value theory approaches on the other hand.

The rationalizing-deciding self sees itself as the decision maker or the locus of control with respect to the three selves. This means that it sees itself as the essential "I" or "the central core around which all psychic activities revolve," even though it generally recognizes that it nevertheless has to "live under the same roof" as the other two selves and so must accommodate their competing demands as best it can in order to preserve some degree of (psychic) peace and harmony in the "home" (Reber, 1985). Seeing itself as the essential "I," the rationalizing-deciding self acts as the guardian of the self-image, accepting those psychic and behavioral aspects of the individual's total make-up that are considered to be "really me" and rejecting those that are not. Now, in order for the rationalizing-deciding self to sustain its view that it really is the decision maker-the essential "I" - it must seek to justify (rationalize) its position in those situations, which may be many, where it would appear not to be "on top of the situation." Thus, the rationalizing-deciding self is the me that "didn't know what came over me" or that "couldn't help myself" when it succumbs to, say, aggressive or sexual impulses of the id-like, desiring-impulsive self. It protects the self-image by seeking to label such actions as "totally out of character." The rationalizing-deciding self is also the me that (if the truth be told) "didn't really want to do it but felt I should" when it goes through the motions in order to accommodate the demands of the superego-like,
normative-judgmental self. Finally, the rationalizing-deciding self is the me that "would have done it (or done it better) if only that (event in the external world) hadn't happened" (again protecting the self-image).

These observations explain the psychoanalytical sense in which the rationalizing-deciding self deserves the rationalizing part of its label. Specifically, this is because the rationalizing-deciding self is a self that specializes in explanations or justifications (i.e., rationalizations) for those situations where it is likely to be, or has been, unable to satisfactorily accommodate psychic- or reality-imposed demands or where it is likely to be, or has been, able to accommodate these demands but only at the expense of betraying those inclinations that it considers to be most genuine (i.e., inclinations that are experienced as being more central to the essential "I" or self-image). However, there is also another reason why the rationalizing-deciding self deserves the rationalizing part of its label, and this reason is the more important of the two in the present context. Specifically, the fact that the rationalizing-deciding self mediates between the competing demands of the desiring-impulsive self, the normative-judgmental self, and the constraints that are imposed by reality means that it is a rationalizing self in the economic, managerial sense that, in order to minimize psychic discomfort, it seeks the most economic or efficient solutions to the competing psychic- and reality-imposed demands and constraints with which it is confronted. This second sense of rationalizing, then, refers not to rationalizing in the sense in which a person is said to rationalize (explain away) their rude behavior or their poor performance in an exam, but rather to rationalizing in the sense in which an industry or bureaucracy is said to rationalize (streamline) its operations in order to maximize its productive capacity per unit of cost; in other words, in order to become more efficient.

Like any good business executive, the rationalizing-deciding self seeks the most economic or efficient solutions to the problems with which it is concerned by adopting a "mini-max" strategy (i.e., a strategy that seeks to minimize potential losses while maximizing potential gains) with respect to the competing demands and constraints with which it is confronted. In economics, gambling, game theory, psychology, sociobiology, and other disciplines concerned with decision theory, a mini-max strategy is generally considered to be the most "rational" strategy for an individual to adopt in making decisions. When people adopt such a strategy we also commonly say that they are being "realistic" or have a "realistic appreciation of the situation." Thus, in terms of the way in which we typically define what does and does not constitute rational or realistic...
decision making behavior, the rationalizing-deciding self is considered to represent the rational or realistic aspect of our psyche. In contrast, the desiring-impulsive self and the normative-judgmental self are considered to be irrational (or at least nonrational) or unrealistic in the sense that both, in their different ways, place too much emphasis on their own demands (appetitive demands on the one hand and moralistic and idealistic demands on the other) and thereby fail to take sufficient account not only of the demands associated with other aspects of the psyche but also of the constraints that are imposed by reality (or, in the case of the normative-judgmental self, sometimes of the opportunities that are offered by reality, as I shall point out below).

This discussion enables us to see more clearly the correspondence between the resource conservation and development and resource preservation approaches on the one hand and the rationalizing-deciding self on the other hand. Specifically, we can see that these resource-based approaches correspond to the rationalizing-deciding self in that, unlike the unrestrained exploitation and expansionism approach in which the id-like, desiring-impulsive self can clearly be said to predominate, these approaches recognize not only (1) the desire for maximum resource exploitation (whether the resource in question is the physical transformation value, the physical nourishment value, the informational value, the experiential value, the symbolic instructional value, or the psychological nourishment value of the nonhuman world to humans), but also (2) the existence of reality-imposed constraints (i.e., that resources are finite), and (3) certain moral demands (i.e., that the interests of other humans—including both present and future generations of humans—ought to be taken into account when making decisions regarding resource usage). The recognition of these competing demands and constraints means that, from the perspective of these resource-based approaches, it is both irrational/unrealistic and immoral to endorse an unrestrained exploitation and expansionism approach since to do so ignores both reality-imposed constraints and anthropocentric moral demands. On the other hand, however, it is also considered to be both irrational/unrealistic and idealistic (as opposed to immoral) to suggest that we ought not to take our "share" of the resources we find (i.e., that we ought to use the resources we find at less than replacement rate—"under-utilize" them—in order to leave more for others than we inherited), since to do so ignores both reality-offered opportunities and appetitive demands.

For these resource-based approaches, then, there is only one kind of approach to the nonhuman world that is considered to
be realistic, as distinct from idealistic, in that it recognizes the appetitive demands of the desiring-impulsive self; realistic, as distinct from unduly optimistic or complacent, in that it recognizes the constraints that are imposed by reality; and realistic, as distinct from wilful, in that it recognizes the anthropocentric moral demands of the normative-judgmental self. That approach corresponds to the "rational," mini-max strategy that is represented by the idea of "maximum sustainable yield," the idea of satisfying appetitive demands to the maximum extent that is possible (or, in other words, the idea of not "wasting" reality-offered opportunities) while also recognizing both reality-imposed constraints and anthropocentric moral demands.

It should be clear that this "realistic," "rational" approach to the nonhuman world, and the dynamics that underlie this approach (i.e., the mini-max trade-offs it makes between appetitive demands, reality-based constraints and opportunities, and moral demands), correspond precisely to the features that characterize, and the dynamics that underlie, the rationalizing-deciding self. Moreover, although it is not my main concern here, it is worth noting that one could develop this correspondence even further by considering the psychoanalytic sense in which the rationalizing-deciding self deserves the rationalizing part of its label. That is to say, the elaborate justifications that people have historically produced in order to justify their lack of moral concern for entities that are not considered to be essentially like themselves (i.e., people of different kinds and the non-human world in general) could obviously be analyzed in terms of the psychoanalytic concept of rationalization.

Before moving on to consider the correspondence between intrinsic value theory approaches and the normative-judgmental self, there are several other points that arise out of the preceding discussion that ought to be noted and/or clarified. First, whereas I have claimed that the resource conservation and development and resource preservation approaches emphasize the rationalizing-deciding self, it could legitimately be claimed that, as far as our relations with other humans are concerned, these approaches emphasize the normative-judgmental self, since they both respect the interests of present and future generations of humans. However, in speaking of these resource-based approaches as emphasizing the rationalizing-deciding self, I have been speaking of the kind of self that they emphasize in regard to our relations with the nonhuman world. I also noted that this qualification applies to the other kinds of selves that I claim are emphasized by the other instrumental and intrinsic value theory approaches.
Second, I have been speaking about the resource conservation and development and resource preservation approaches jointly in this discussion because the difference between them is purely one of emphasis. On the one hand, both approaches represent "restrained" (sometimes referred to as "wise use" or "responsible management") resource-based approaches in that they stand opposed to the unrestrained exploitation and expansionism approach. On the other hand, both approaches share with the unrestrained exploitation and expansionism approach the fact that they see the nonhuman world purely in resource (or instrumental value) terms. This means that both generally attempt to argue their case in economic terms since such terms represent the lingua franca of instrumental value theory approaches. Where the resource conservation and development and resource preservation approaches differ is simply in regard to how broadly they construe what counts as a resource. Whereas the resource conservation and development approach construes resources in terms of their physical transformation value (albeit under a regime of sustainable use), the resource preservation approach emphasizes the physical nourishment, informational, experiential, symbolic instructional, and psychological nourishment "yields" that can be gained by preserving certain members or aspects of the nonhuman world. Thus, advocates of the resource preservation approach typically attempt to show that preserving certain members or aspects of the nonhuman world is likely to produce a greater economic yield (e.g., in terms of human health or psychological well-being, in terms of tourism, in terms of helping scientists to develop new kinds of crops or discover cures for certain diseases, in terms of the loss of productive land through erosion and desertification, and so on) than exploiting that resource in a sustainable way for its physical transformation values. Both approaches, in other words, seek mini-max outcomes (i.e., the maximization of sustainable yield), but they differ in regard to the nature of the "yields" that they are concerned to maximize on a sustainable basis, and, hence, in regard to the nature of the "variables" that they are concerned to take into account in deriving their "rational," mini-max "solutions."

It should also be noted here that although the non-material kinds of values that are emphasized in the resource preservation approach can usually be assigned some kind of economic value, this is not a necessary condition for the derivation of mini-max solutions. This is because it is quite possible to assign psychological utility to a non-material value without assigning it a corresponding economic value or, alternatively, without agreeing that this psychological utility is adequately reflected in the economic value that others have assigned it.
Finally, although it is useful to distinguish the resource conservation and development and resource preservation approaches for expository purposes, it should of course be noted that many "real world" resource-based approaches represent hybrids of these two "restrained" or "responsible management" resource-based approaches. That is, "real world" resource-based approaches may take both material (i.e., physical transformation) instrumental values and non-material instrumental values into account in seeking mini-max resource management solutions (e.g., they may take into account the income that could be derived from logging as well as the income that could be derived from tourism—or even simply the psychological utility that preservation of a certain area may afford present and future generations of humans). The rationalizing-deciding self is clearly emphasized in these hybrid situations just as it is in the ideal-typical resource conservation and development and resource preservation approaches. Moreover, it should also be obvious from these considerations that some "real world" situations effectively represent uncomfortable mixtures of both "responsible management" and unrestrained resource-based approaches, while others represent equally uncomfortable mixtures of both "responsible management" resource-based approaches and intrinsic value theory approaches. It is therefore necessary to speak of the self that is emphasized in these situations as one that fluctuates between, or as one that represents an often psychically uncomfortable mixture of, the rationalizing-deciding self and the desiring-impulsive self on the one hand and the rationalizing-deciding self and the normative-judgmental self on the other hand.

When we move on to consider those approaches that break with our anthropocentric traditions and argue for the moral considerability of the nonhuman world (i.e., intrinsic value theory approaches), we see that, however much these approaches may play upon one's feelings and inspire one to feel a certain way toward certain members or aspects of the nonhuman world, the end that such approaches serve is, finally, that of showing that certain members or aspects of the nonhuman world are morally considerable irrespective of how one personally happens to feel about them. Objectivist intrinsic value theory approaches, in other words, are ultimately normative-judgmental in character. They attempt to show that it is morally wrong to do some things to certain members or aspects of the nonhuman world and morally right to do other things; that one's personal likes and dislikes—one's personal prejudices—are neither here nor there with respect to the validity of these judgments; and that, where conflict occurs between intrinsic value-based concerns (i.e., moral concerns) and either appetitive, desiring-impulsive concerns or anthropocentric,
"responsible management" concerns, it is the intrinsic value-based concerns that should be given overriding priority.

These observations clearly suggest that the kind of self that is emphasized in intrinsic value theory approaches is the super-ego-like, normative-judgmental self, which, *inter alia*, decrees what *ought* to be and demands conformance with a certain code of conduct. This point can be illustrated further by comparing the ways in which the rationalizing-deciding self and the normative-judgmental self deal with particular intrinsic value theory claims. Take the ethical sentientism approach as an example. Ethical sentientists claim that it is always morally wrong to cause unnecessary suffering and that this implies that we should all be vegetarian (in view of this, Singer's already classic statement, *Animal Liberation*, concludes with an appendix entitled, "Cooking for Liberated People," which provides a helpful guide to vegetarian cooking and an annotated list of vegetarian cookbooks). The approach of the rationalizing-deciding self to such normative-judgmental claims is to weigh them against the desiring-impulsive self's desire to eat meat, which may be strong, and to consider these competing demands within the context of the general availability of meat, which, these days, usually means its price. For the rationalizing-deciding self, each of these factors simply represents one factor that must be taken into account among others. Thus, the rationalizing-deciding self's mini-max solution to these competing psychic demands and reality-based constraints or opportunities is, in general, not to stop eating meat altogether but rather to eat somewhat less than was eaten prior to registering the normative-judgmental claims of ethical sentientism, In contrast, the normative-judgmental self gives overriding priority to moral claims and so demands that one should stop eating meat altogether. The normative-judgmental self, in other words, is the psychological face of intrinsic value theory approaches since these approaches demand that intrinsic values should, in principle, be accorded overriding priority in deciding how to act as opposed to being regarded as "just another" factor that needs to be taken into account.

The overriding nature of moral claims is most obvious to us in the human realm. Here, for example, claims regarding the intrinsic worth of people mean that, in principle, it is always wrong to torture another person. It is no defense to say that you took their desire not to be tortured "into account" but nevertheless reached a decision that, "on balance," your desire to torture them, along with the likelihood that your crime would not be discovered (i.e., the lack of reality-based constraints), outweighed this "other factor." In respect of interactions between humans, it is *expected* that the interests of
the normative-judgmental self should override any contrary decisions that the rationalizing-deciding self may take. Eco-philosophical intrinsic value theorists simply attempt to extend the domain of activities in which this expectation holds.

This overview of the various kinds of self that are emphasized by the most widely recognized approaches to ecophilosophy should now enable us to see more clearly what it is that distinguishes transpersonal ecology from these approaches.

THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF THE TRANSPERSONAL ECOLOGY APPROACH TO ECOPHILOSOPHY

We have thus far concentrated on the differences between the various kinds of self that are emphasized by the most widely recognized approaches to ecophilosophy. However, if we now consider what these selves have in common we can see that transpersonal ecology emphasizes a fundamentally different kind of self to those emphasized in the foregoing tripartite model of the psyche. This is because, whatever their qualitative differences, the desiring-impulsive self, the rationalizing-deciding self, and the normative-judgmental self all refer to a narrow, atomistic, or particle-like conception of self whereas the transpersonal self refers to a wide, expansive, or field-like conception of self. This can be explained as follows. The desiring-impulsive self and the rationalizing-deciding self are both concerned with their own self-interest in the sense in which that term is commonly understood, that is, where the self whose interests are being referred to is conceived in a narrow, atomistic, or particle-like sense. The difference between the desiring-impulsive self and the rationalizing-deciding self is essentially that the former is concerned with its own self-interest in an ignorant or unenlightened sense (it wants to eat all the cake today even if that means that it may go hungry tomorrow and even if such heavy consumption serves to make it sick), whereas the latter is concerned with its own self-interest in an informed or enlightened sense (it realizes that there will be no cake left tomorrow if it eats it all today; that it is likely to make itself sick if it consumes the cake too quickly; and that it "pays" to share some of the cake with other entities of the same kind since these entities are likely to value one more if one does this and to reciprocate in the future). The normative-judgmental self has different interests to those of the other two selves in that it is concerned with the satisfaction of idealistic and moralistic standards (or norms) rather than with the satisfaction of unenlightened or enlightened appetitive demands. However, these interests are still related to a self that is conceived in a narrow, atomistic, or particle-like sense. The
idealistic and moralistic demands that are issued by the normative-judgmental self are all of the kind that this particular self should do better than it has done (or than other selves have done), that other selves should do better than they have done, that this particular self should respect other entities, or that other selves should respect entities other than themselves (including, especially, this particular self).

It is important to note that even if the moral demands of the normative-judgmental self are of the (unusual) kind that one ought to abandon exclusive identification with a narrow, atomistic, or particle-like sense of self and develop a wide, expansive, or field-like sense of self, the self that is being addressed-the self that "ought" to do this-is still this particular self as distinct from other particular selves. Moral demands, in other words, proceed from the assumption of a narrow conception of self even when the end they aim for is the realization of an expansive sense of self. There is no way around this; it is inherent in the nature of moral demands. Moral demands necessarily emphasize a self that is capable of choice, a self that is a center of volitional activity, yet our sense of self can be far more expansive than that of being a center of volitional activity. For example, I can experience my volitional self as part of a larger sense of self that includes aspects of my own mind and body over which I do not experience myself as having particularly much control (and toward which it therefore makes no sense to issue moral demands). In turn, I can also experience this larger, but still entirely personal, sense of self as part of a still more expansive, transpersonal sense of self that includes my family and friends, other animals, physical objects, the region in which I live, and so on. When this happens, I experience physical or symbolic violations of the integrity of these entities as violations of my self, and I am moved to defend these entities accordingly. However, to attempt to instill the realization of an expansive, transpersonal sense of self through moral demands is counter-productive since moral demands are directed to and thereby reinforce the primary reality of the narrow, atomistic, or particle-like volitional self.

In contrast to the narrow, atomistic, or particle-like conceptions of self that underlie the desiring-impulsive self, the rationalizing-deciding self, and the normative-judgmental self, the transpersonal ecological conception of self is a wide, expansive, or field-like conception from the outset. This has the highly interesting, even startling, consequence that ethics (conceived as being concerned with moral "oughts") is rendered superfluous! The reason for this is that if one has a wide, expansive, or field-like sense of self, then (assuming that

*a larger, more expansive transpersonal sense of self*
Care flows naturally if the "self" is widened and deepened so that protection of free Nature is felt and conceived as protection of ourselves. . . just as we need not morals to make us breathe, . . . [so] if your "self" in the wide sense embraces another being, you need no moral exhortation to show care, . . . You care for yourself without feeling any moral pressure to do it—provided you have not succumbed to a neurosis of some kind, developing self-destructive tendencies, or hating yourself.

The idea of self-realization (of one kind or another) rendering morality superfluous is also found in various religious or spiritual traditions. For example, Walt Anderson (1980), in his book *Open Secrets: A Western Guide to Tibetan Buddhism,* distinguishes between exoteric religious traditions, which are concerned with outer forms such as "codes of morality . . ., rituals ... [and] a common store of beliefs," and esoteric religious traditions, which are "concerned with personal growth and the evolution of the mind." He explains that

In the esoteric traditions, codes of morality are less important [than in the exoteric traditions] for the simple reason that the ultimate purpose of the spiritual effort is to attain a level of personal development at which morality is natural. It is discovered within oneself; and external authority is no longer necessary or meaningful. This principle is not foreign to Western psychology, . . . The same point is made by Abraham Maslow in his studies of healthy, "self-actualizing" people, who, he says, have relatively little respect for the formal rules and regulations of the society but at the same time a strong sense of concern for others (Anderson, 1980, p. 19).

Daniel Goleman (1978), in his book *The Varieties of the Meditative Experience,* similarly notes that the emphasis that Zen places upon the "transformation of personality" is such that "there is little emphasis in Zen on moral precepts. Rather than merely imposing precepts from the outside, their observance emerges from within as a by-product of the change in consciousness zazen can bring" (p. 95).

Elaborating this general theme into a strategy for the future development of ecophilsophy, Naess (1987a) says:

Academically speaking, what I suggest is the supremacy of environmental ontology and realism over environmental ethics as
a means of invigorating the environmental movement in the years to come. If reality is like it is experienced by the ecological self, our behaviour naturally and beautifully follows norms of strict environmental ethics. We certainly need to hear about our ethical shortcomings from time to time . . . but when people feel they unselfishly give up, even sacrifice, their interest in order to show love for Nature, this is probably in the long run a treacherous basis for conservation. Through identification [Which, as we shall see, is the key term in transpersonal ecology] they may come to see their own interest served by conservation, through genuine self-love, love of a deepened and widened self (pp, 40, 36).

In understanding what it is that is distinctive about the transpersonal ecological approach to ecophilosophy (i.e., Naess's philosophical sense of deep ecology), it is crucial to understand that Naess rejects approaches that issue in moral "oughts" (and, hence, objectivist intrinsic value theory approaches) again and again in his writings. For example, speaking in Australia in 1984, Naess said:

I'm not much interested in ethics or morals. I'm interested in how we experience the world. . . . Ethics follows from how we experience the world. If you experience the world so and so, then you don't kill. If you articulate your experience, then it can be a philosophy or religion (quoted in Devall, 1984a).

In Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, Naess (1989) draws upon Kant's distinction (put forward in Kant's (PBS, 1972) Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals) between benevolent actions that are performed out of inclination and benevolent actions that are performed out of duty. Naess endorses actions of the former kind, which he associates with the idea of "Self-realization," over actions of the latter kind:

Inspired by Kant, one may speak of "beautiful" and of "moral" action. Moral actions are motivated by acceptance of a moral law, and manifest themselves clearly when acting against inclination. A person acts beautifully when acting benevolently from inclination. . . . Assuming that we wish benevolent action to flourish, some of us stress the need for teaching about the moral law, others stress the need for more understanding of the condition under which people get to be benevolent and well-informed through natural inclination. I take this process to be one of maturation as much as of learning. If the conditions for maturation are bad, the process of identification [Which, for Naess, is central to the realization of an expansive sense of self] is inhibited and egotisms of various sorts stiffen into permanent traits.

So the norm "Self-realization!" is a condensed expression of the unity of certain social, psychological, and ontological hypotheses: the most comprehensive and deep maturity of the human
personality guarantees \textit{beautiful action}. This is based on traits of human nature. We need not repress ourselves; we need to develop our Self. The beautiful acts are natural and by definition not squeezed forth through respect for a moral law foreign to mature human development ... (Naess, 1989, pp. 85-86).

Although Naess refers to "Self-realization!" as a norm, it is obvious from his comments here and below in regard to ethics and moral laws that in using the term norm he does not mean to imply any kind of moral "ought" (i.e., an "ought" that is morally binding on others). Rather, when Naess refers to "Self-realization!" as a norm he simply means that it represents the overarching or most generally formulated positive goal or value within his own attempt to articulate his views in a logically systematic fashion. Unlike intrinsic value theorists, Naess at no stage attempts to prove the correctness of his views in such a way as to make this norm (or any of the norms he derives from it by the addition of hypotheses) morally binding on others. I discuss this point and the reason for it later.

Naess often draws upon the above Kantian-based distinction in rejecting ethical approaches:

Now, my point is that perhaps we should in environmental affairs primarily try to influence people towards beautiful acts. Work on their inclinations rather than morals. Unhappily, the extensive moralizing within environmentalism has given the public the false impression that we primarily ask them to sacrifice, to show more responsibility, more concern, better morals. . . All that can be achieved by altruism—the \textit{dutiful, moral} consideration of others—can be achieved and much more through widening and deepening ourself. Following Kant we then act beautifully, but neither morally nor immorally (Naess, 1987a, pp. 40, 35).

I have a somewhat extreme appreciation of what Kant calls beautiful actions (good actions based on inclination), in contrast to dutiful ones. The choice of the formulation "Self-realization!" is in part motivated by the belief that maturity in humans can be measured along a scale from selfishness to Selfishness, that is, broadening and deepening the self, rather than measures of dutiful altruism (Naess, 1986a, p. 29).

One learns more from people who are superb in their capacity of acting benevolently by inclination than from people who are masters in acting morally, but against their inclinations. I try to point to the former as sources of inspiration rather than the latter (Naess, 1982, p. 264).

The history of cruelty inflicted in the name of morals has convinced me that increase of identification [the process through which the

Commenting on another philosopher's discussion of the relevance of Spinoza's thought to eephilosophy, Naess says (and note his emphases):

Central to Lloyd's conception of a metaphysics of environmentalism is the moral badness of exploiting animals for the sake of humans and, in general, of not treating the non-human realm as an end or value in itself. The term “moral” is used throughout her argumentation. But isn't Spinoza's philosophy [which Naess elsewhere interprets in terms of his concept of "Self-realization!"] one of generosity, fortitude, and love rather than of morals? Do we need to shift to moralizing in order to find a satisfactory metaphysics of environmentalism? If so, Spinoza cannot be of much help... We need not say that today man's relation to the nonhuman world is immoral. It is enough to say that it lacks generosity, fortitude, and love (Naess, 1980).

In response to another philosopher, Naess writes:

I have the impression that Rollin refers to concepts of intrinsic value which are developed by professional metaphysicians. I do not need them. What Rollin says about the parasitologist suggests that [the parasitologist] appreciates [the value of parasites] independently of any narrow use for humans. He appreciates the meaningfulness of doing things for their own sake. This is all I need for my concept of intrinsic value. The parasitologist has respect for life! "Let the worms live!" (Naess, 1987b).

It is important to understand what Naess is saying here. On the one hand, Naess does not reject the use of the term intrinsic value—indeed, he uses this term in the first point of his and Sessions' eight point platform of the deep ecology movement. On the other hand, however, Naess does not intend any formal philosophical meaning by this term and so does not intend a meaning that implies a moral "ought." This should be obvious from Naess's other comments to the effect that he is "not much interested in ethics or morals." Rather, Naess simply wishes to employ the term intrinsic value in an expressive, metaphorical, nontechnical, everyday sense. The meaning that Naess gives to this term, in other words, is phenomenological rather than moral: people will say colloquially (i.e., without any reference to formal philosophical views regarding the nature of intrinsic value) that they experience certain entities as being valuable "for their own sake" or "in and of themselves," and others understand them when they say this. Thus, when Naess says, "I do not need... concepts of intrinsic value which are..."
developed by professional metaphysicians" but then goes on to say that it is meaningful to appreciate the value of entities "independent of any narrow use for humans" and that "this is all I need for my concept of intrinsic value:" he is saying that his sense of the term intrinsic value is an expressive, metaphorical, nontechnical, everyday one rather than a formal philosophical one. Naess makes this clear when he says elsewhere in the same paper:

I shall not join a battle of professionals, but speak up in defence of certain ways of thinking and talking among plain people. . . . Among people who are not heavily influenced by certain philosophical or juridical terminology, it is common to be concerned about animals regardless of sentience, and for flowers, patches of landscapes, ecosystems, for their own sake. Often people would say they are beautiful, but also they defend their presence because they "belong there," "is part of the whole," etc. (Naess, 1987b, pp. 3,8).

Naess adopts this point of view whenever he employs the term intrinsic value or similar terms. Thus, for example, in his 1979 paper on "Self-realization in Mixed Communities of Humans, Bears, Sheep, and Wolves." Naess points out that "the ascription of rights to animals frequently occurs among 'ordinary' people, that is, people without special formal education. It is their use, rather than that of people versed in law or philosophy, that guides my own" (p. 231). Naess also notes in this paper that "it is fairly unimportant whether the term 'rights [of animals]' is or is not used in the fight for human peaceful coexistence with a rich fauna." If we look at Naess's more recent papers, such as his 1986b paper entitled "Intrinsic Value: Will the Defenders of Nature Please Riser," we continue to find him defending the "everyday use" of expressions like intrinsic value and for its own sake against the "abstract" (meaning the formal philosophical) uses of such expressions (p. 505).

Other thinkers who are close to Naess have also made the point that critics misunderstand him if they attempt to read subscription to formal philosophical views that imply moral "oughts" into his use of common terms like rights and intrinsic value. Not only does this point underpin my monograph length response (Fox, 1986) to Richard Sylvan's critique of deep ecology, but it was also made some years earlier by George Sessions (1981) in response to the same critic. Sessions wrote in his 1981 Ecophilosophy newsletter:

Routley [now Sylvan] mistake[s] what Naess is up to. Naess's position is not, .. "an extension of conventional Western ethics" [quoting Routley] .... Biocentric egalitarianism is essentially a
rejection of human chauvinistic ethical theory and the criteria used to ascribe rights and value; it is a reductio-ad-absurdum of conventional ethics. Biocentric egalitarianism is essentially a statement of non-anthropocentrism. Naess’s original formulation [by which Sessions means the 1973 Inquiry paper in which Naess introduced the shallow/deep distinction] lends itself to misunderstanding in that he speaks of the equal right of all things to live and blossom into their own unique forms of self-realization. (However, Naess makes it clear ("Self-realization in Mixed Communities of Humans, Bears, Sheep, and Wolves," 1979) that he is not proposing a "rights" theory in the sense of contemporary ethical theory, but is using the word "right" in a metaphorical or everyday sense.

Writing in response to a paper of my own, Naess confirms Sessions’ view that the term biocentric egalitarianism is not intended as a formal philosophical position that implies a moral "ought" but rather simply as "a statement of non-anthropocentrism":

The abstract term "biospherical egalitarianism in principle" and certain similar terms which I have used, do perhaps more harm than good. They suggest a positive doctrine, and that is too much. The importance of the intuition is rather its capacity to counteract the perhaps only momentary, but consequential, self-congratulatory and lordly attitude towards what seems less developed, less complex, less miraculous (Naess, 1984; see also Fox, 1984).

Now what most distinguishes the other main writers on deep ecology (and those considered to be closely associated with them) from the mainstream of writers on ecosophy (i.e., from philosophical intrinsic value theorists) is that they agree not only with Naess’s rejection of formal intrinsic value theory approaches but also with the transpersonal, realization-of-as-expansive-a-sense-of-self-as-possible approach that Naess advocates in preference to these approaches. It is not always easy to disentangle these features in the work of these writers because they often reject approaches that issue in moral "oughts" in much the same breath as they endorse the transpersonal kind of approach that Naess advocates. However, it is useful to attempt to isolate these two features insofar as it is possible to do so in order to show that deep ecologists or, as I would prefer to say, transpersonal ecologists, are not simply united in opposition to approaches that issue in moral "oughts" but are also united in subscription to the approach that I have referred to as transpersonal ecology (i.e., the this-worldly realization of as expansive a sense of self as possible).

Thus, before providing an indication of the extent to which the main writers on deep ecology and their close associates endorse Naess’s transpersonal approach to ecosophy, I want to
provide an indication of the extent to which these writers agree with Naess's rejection of approaches that issue in moral "oughts." The best way of doing this is, I think, simply to present examples of what the main writers on deep ecology and their close associates say. Although I trust that readers will find them to be highly interesting in their own right, the particular quotations that follow seem to be repetitive in their general theme. However, the fact that these authors are saying very similar things is precisely the point.

George Sessions:

The search for an environmental ethics, in the conventional modern sense (which Routley wants to endorse) seems wrong-headed and fruitless. . . [Routley] thinks "an environmental ethic can be as tough, practical, rational and secular as prevailing Western ethics." I find this neither desirable nor necessary, and perhaps not possible. . . . The search then, as I understand it, is not for environmental ethics but for ecological consciousness (Sessions, 1981, p. 5a).

A logically air-tight formulation of a non-anthropocentric ecological metaphysics or an impeccably formulated "environmental ethics" is not going to solve our problems, even if such things are possible, although they would be of some use and value just as the formulation of paradigms has some value. However, our problems seem to channel down ultimately to human psychology, or states of consciousness, or more generally to the state of being of the whole organism. . . . Those philosophers who see the philosophical environmental problem mainly as one of developing an ethics of the environment fail to understand the major scientific/epistemological/social paradigm shift which is now underway. Conceptual analysis will be valuable but . . . the attempt to solve these epistemological problems on purely logical or conceptual grounds is to fail to realize that this approach is itself part of the old paradigm which needs to be replaced (Sessions, 1983, p. 4).

Bill Devall:

Cultivating ecological consciousness precedes and pre-empts the search for an "environmental ethic" (Devall, 1981, p. 6).

While some philosophers see appropriate environmental ethics as the primary task, others understand that the important task is . . . [that of] the psychological development from narrow, egotistical "self" to identification with the whole. . . . This issue of environmental ethics versus ecological consciousness has practical implications. It is not just a disagreement among some philosophers . . . [The former approach] fails to touch the core of the self (Devall, 1984, p. 8).

As we discover our ecological self we will joyfully defend and
interact with that with which we identify; and instead of imposing environmental ethics on people, we will naturally respect, love, honor and protect that which is of our self.

Extending awareness and receptivity with other animals and mountains and rivers encourages identification and engenders respect for and solidarity with the field of identification. This does not mean there will never be conflicts between the vital material needs of different people or between some humans and some other animals in specific situations, but it does mean that a basis for "good actions" or "right livelihood" is not based alone on abstract moralism, self-denial, or sacrifice.

We need to be reminded of our moral duties occasionally, but we change our behavior more simply with richer ends through encouragement. Deeper perception of reality and deeper and broader perception of self is what I call ecological realism. That is, in philosophical terms, however important environmental ethics are, ontology is the center of ecosophic concerns (Devall, 1988, pp, 42-44).

Andrew McLaughlin:

The heart of deep ecology, according to Devall and Sessions, is the cultivation of "ecological consciousness" [by which they mean the same as Naess means by "Self-realization"]). . . . This makes deep ecology a rather more demanding position than contemporary philosophers usually deal with, as it insists on the fundamental importance of the question of what sort of person should I strive to become?

This concern of deep ecology with the development of the self harks back to the concerns of Greek philosophy with the development of character. As such, this pushes philosophy beyond the bounds it has usually accepted in the twentieth century. It brings to the fore the normative question of how should I be, rather than addressing the more abstract and impersonal questions about the nature of value, the structure of moral argument, and so on. In this shift of focus, deep ecologists open an old and central question in a new context, . . .

[Yet] this is precisely the question that environmental philosophy must address. Disputes over whether or not Nature has or has not "intrinsic value" may not be the central question (McLaughlin, 1987, p, 2).

Alan Drengson:

What identifies us in terms of certain cultural patterns does not exhaust the richer possibilities that each of us contains. The conception we have of ourselves as social and human beings comes to constitute an ego self, a self image, which is narrowly boundary and defined, and which is ultimately based on a rigid
array of dualisms that have their basis in a subject/object dichotomy and a human/nature antagonism.

What deep ecology directs us toward, then, is neither an environmental axiology or theory of environmental ethics nor a minor reform of existing practices. It directs us to develop our own sense of self until it becomes Self, that is, until we realize through deepening ecological sensibilities that each of us forms a union with the natural world, and that protection of the natural world is protection of ourselves (Drengson, 1981; 1988).

Michael Zimmerman:

In the light of the foregoing analysis, we can say that to determine what kinds of behavior are morally appropriate, we must know what we ourselves and other beings are. In other words, ontology precedes ethics. . . . Deep ecologists claim that before knowing what we ought to do, we must understand who we really are (Zimmerman, 1986).

Neil Evernden:

Even the call for an environmental ethic is an admission of this stance [i.e., "our prior action in saying 'It' to the world and to each other" or, in other words, our prior action in conceiving of ourself in a narrow, atomistic, or particle-like way such that other entities are likewise seen as "atomistic individuals"], for ethics in Anglo-American philosophy deals with the means of structuring the interactions of atomistic individuals. It is almost another technical fix, a cultural corrective to a congenital deformity. . . . Understanding ourselves is the first task of ethics, and the ethics we derive will depend on our understanding of Being (Evernden, 1985).

Recasting Evernden's "it is almost another technical fix" comment in terms of the tripartite analysis of the self presented earlier, we could say that the moralistic demands of the normative-judgmental self represent an introjected "cultural correction" to the "congenital deformity" of what people often refer to as our animal, lower, or primitive nature (i.e., our desiring-impulsive self).

John Livingston:

What one is after is not moral guidance but experiential knowing. . . . In nature I can find no place for even the most elegantly contrived rationalization of rights between species. The notion of rights as applied to interspecies affairs is probably a blind alley.

Such also seems to be the unfortunate conclusion, in deep ecology,
for most branches of western ethics ... So far as I can determine, ethics and morals are unknown in nature. There appears to be no need for them .... Ethics and morals were, I believe, invented by one species to meet the particular needs of that species. They have nothing whatever to do with the rest of nature. ... Conventional moral philosophy and ethics are, I believe, prosthetic devices. ... [What we need instead is an] extended consciousness which transcends mere self, ... I see this extended sense of belonging as a fundamental biological (and thus human) imperative. I think that the thwarting of such an imperative is in some absolute sense wrong. ... I cannot however explicate its wrongness by way of any branch of western ethics and moral philosophy of which I am aware (Livingston, 1984).

John Rodman:

Thanks to this ["the taboo against committing the naturalistic fallacy"] the quest for an ethics is reduced to prattle about "values" taken in abstraction from the "facts" of experience; the notion of an ethics as an organic ethos, a way of life, remains lost to us. ... From the standpoint of an ecology of humanity, it is curious how little appreciation there has been of the limitations of the moral/legal stage of consciousness. If an existing system of moral and legal coercion does not suffice, our tendency is to assume that the solution lies in more of the same, in "greatly extending the laws and rules which already are beginning to govern our treatment of nature .... " It is worth asking whether the ceaseless struggle to extend morality and legality may by now be more a part of our problem than its solution (Rodman, 1977).

Joanna Macy:

Indeed. I consider that this shift [to an emphasis on our "capacity to identify with the larger collective of all beings"] is essential to our survival at this point in history precisely because it can serve in lieu of morality and because moralizing is ineffective. Sermons seldom hinder us from pursuing our self-interest, so we need to be a little more enlightened about what our self-interest is. It would not occur to me, for example, to exhort you to refrain from cutting off your leg. That wouldn’t occur to me or to you, because your leg is part of you. Well, so are the trees in the Amazon Basin; they are our external lungs. We are just beginning to wake up to that. We are gradually discovering that we are our world (Macy, 1987).

So much, then, in regard to the question of the extent to which the main writers on deep ecology and their close associates reject approaches that issue in moral "oughts." But what about the question of the extent to which these writers endorse Naess's transpersonal approach to ecophilosophy? The key to seeing the commonality that exists between these writers in this regard is the concept of identification. Thus, Arne Naess writes:
A couple of thousand years of philosophical, psychological and social-psychological thinking has not brought us any stable conception of the I, ego, or the self. In modern psychotherapy these notions play an indispensable role, but, of course, the practical goal of therapy does not necessitate philosophical clarification of the terms. . . . I shall only offer one single sentence resembling a definition of the ecological self. The ecological self of a person is that with which this person identifies.

This key sentence (rather than definition) about the self shifts the burden of clarification from the term "self" to that of "identification;" or rather "process of identification."

Every living being is connected intimately, and from this intimacy follows the capacity of identification and as its natural consequences, practice of non-violence .... Now is the time to share with all life on our maltreated earth through the deepening identification with life forms and the greater units, the ecosystems, and Gaia, the fabulous, old planet of ours (Naess, 1987a).

Throughout his writings, Naess emphasizes identification as the process through which one realizes an expansive sense of self:

*How do we develop a wider self?* . . . The self is as comprehensive as the totality of our identifications. Or, more succinctly; our Self is that with which we identify. The question then reads: How do we widen identifications? (Naess, 1985, p. 261).

Self-realization cannot develop far without sharing joys and sorrows with others, or more fundamentally, without the development of the narrow ego of the small child into the comprehensive structure of a Self that comprises all human beings. The [deep] ecological movement-as many earlier philosophical movements -takes a step further and asks for a development such that there is a deep identification of individuals with all life (Naess, 1977, p. 71).

In my outline of a philosophy (Ecosophy T) "Self-realization!" is the logically (derivationally) supreme norm, but it is not an eternal or permanent Self that is postulated. When the formulation is made more precise it is seen that the Self in question is a symbol of identification with an absolute maximum range of beings (Naess, 1983, p. 13).

And from *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle*:

The ecosophical outlook is developed through an identification so deep that one's own self is no longer adequately delimited by the personal ego or the organism. One experiences oneself to be a genuine part of all life. . . .

We are not outside the rest of nature and therefore cannot do with
it as we please without changing ourselves.... We are a part of the ecosphere just as intimately as we are a part of our own society.... Human beings who wish to attain a maximum perspective in the comprehension of their cosmic condition can scarcely refrain from a proud feeling of genuine participation in something immensely greater than their individual and social career. Paleontology reveals... that the development of life on earth is an integrated process, despite the steadily increasing diversity and complexity. The nature and limitation of this unity can be debated. Still, this is something basic. "Life is fundamentally one."

My concern here is the human capability of identification, the human joy in the identification with [for example] the salmon on its way to its spawning grounds, and the sorrow felt upon the thoughtless reduction of the access to such important places. . . . When solidarity and loyalty are solidly anchored in identificarian, they are not experienced as moral demands; they come of themselves (Naess, 1989, pp. 164--74).

When Naess or other transpersonal ecologists emphasize 'the importance of wider and deeper identification, it is important in interpreting them not to get carried away in flights of imaginative fancy but rather to understand what is being said as far as possible in a down-to-earth, ordinary, everyday sense. Identification should be taken to mean what we ordinarily understand by that term, that is, the experience not simply of a sense of similarity with an entity but of a sense of commonality.

To pursue this further, one can have a sense of certain similarities between oneself and another entity without necessarily identifying with that entity, that is without necessarily experiencing a sense of commonality with that entity. On the other hand, the experience of commonality with another entity does imply a sense of similarity with that entity, even if this similarity is not of any obvious physical, emotional, or mental kind; it may involve "nothing more" than the deep-seated realization that all entities are aspects of a single unfolding reality. What identification should not be taken to mean, however, is identity-that I literally am that tree over there, for example. What is being emphasized is the tremendously common experience that through the process of identification my sense of self (my experiential self) can expand to include the tree even though I and the tree remain physically "separate" (even here, however, the word separate must not be taken too literally because ecology tells us that my physical self and the tree are physically interlinked in all sorts of ways).

Expressing this point another way, the realization that we and all other entities are aspects of a single unfolding reality-s-that "Life is fundamentally one"-does not mean that all multipli-
city and diversity is reduced to homogeneous mush. As Naess says, the idea that we are "drops in the stream of life" may be misleading if it implies that individuality of the drops is lost in the stream. Here is a difficult ridge to walk: To the left we have the ocean of organic and mystic views, to the right the abyss of atomic individualism" (Naess, 1989, p. 165). Thus, for transpersonal ecologists, the fact that we and all other entities are aspects of a single unfolding reality means neither that all entities are fundamentally the same nor that they are absolutely autonomous but rather simply that they are relatively autonomous—a fact that emerges not only from ecological science but also from physics, evolutionary biology, and recent systems-oriented work on autopoietic systems and dissipative structures. (Indeed, in much the same way that a wide variety of recent research on nonlinear dynamical systems is being subsumed under the generic name of chaos theory, so the systems-oriented work that I have just referred to on autopoietic systems and dissipative structures could perhaps be referred to as autonomy theory. This is because the latter work centers on the question of how certain complex systems manage to organize themselves in such a way as to resist the universal tendency toward increasingly greater disorder, and thereby retain a considerable—but by no means an absolute—degree of autonomy relative to their environment.)

These comments on the relative autonomy of all entities stand in stark contrast to the view expressed by Richard Sylvan, in his monograph A Critique of Deep Ecology, that Naess goes "the fun metaphysical distance to extreme holism, to the shocker that there are no separate things in the world, no wilderness to traverse or for Muir to save[1]" (Sylvan, 1985, p. 27). If transpersonal ecologists thought that all entities were fundamentally the same then they would speak in terms of identity rather than identification; if they thought that all entities were absolutely autonomous then they would never have taken up their approach since, for them, identification is a natural (i.e., spontaneous) psychological response to the fact that we are intimately bound up with the world around us.

The view that our sense of self can be as expansive as our identifications and that a realistic appreciation of the ways in which we are intimately bound up with the world around us inevitably leads to wider and deeper identification (and, thus, to the realization of a more expansive sense of self) pervades not only Naess's work but also the work of the other main writers on deep ecology and their close associates. The only qualification to note here is that Heideggerian- and Zen-influenced supporters of deep ecology such as Michael Zimmerman and Robert Aitken are more inclined to speak in

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terms of the realization of a more open sense of self—or the realization of openness-than in dimensional terms, that is in terms of the realization of a wider, deeper, larger, or more expansive sense of self. The best way of illustrating this claim about what it is that unites the main writers on deep ecology and their close associates in a positive sense (as opposed to what it is that unites them in a negative sense, namely, their opposition to approaches that issue in moral "oughts") is again to present examples of what the main writers on deep ecology and their close associates say. Once again, the repetitive nature of these quotations—the fact that these authors are saying very similar things—is precisely the point.

Bill Devall:

Exploring ecological self is part of the transforming process required to heal ourselves in the world. Practicing means breathing the air with renewed awareness of the winds. When we drink water we trace it to its sources—a spring or mountain stream in our bioregion—and contemplate the cycles of energy as part of our body. The "living waters" and "living mountains" enter our body. We are part of the evolutionary journey and contain in our bodies connections with our Pleistocene ancestors.

Extending awareness and receptivity with other animals and mountains and rivers encourages identification and engenders respect for and solidarity with the field of identification. . . . Since many people live only with a narrow awareness of self due to their cultural conditioning, it is most important in the deep, long-range movement to encourage the deeper ecological self to contribute to the flourishing of self-realization in the whole biosphere (Devall, 1988, pp. 42, 70).

George Sessions:

Ecological consciousness is the result of a psychological expansion of the narrowly encapsulated sense of self as isolated ego, through identification with all humans (species chauvinism), to finally an awareness of identification and interpenetration of self with ecosystem and biosphere (Sessions, 1981, p. 5a).

Devall and Sessions:

In keeping with the spiritual traditions of many of the world's religions, the deep ecology norm of Self-realization goes beyond the modern Western self which is defined as an isolated ego striving primarily for hedonistic gratification or for a narrow sense of individual Salvation in this life or the next. This socially programmed sense of the narrow self or social self dislocates us, and leaves us prey to whatever fad or fashion is prevalent in our society or social reference group. We are thus robbed of beginning.
the search for our unique spiritual biological personhood. Spiritual growth, or unfolding, begins when we cease to understand or see ourselves as isolated and narrow competing egos and begin to identify with other humans from our family and friends to, eventually, our species. But the deep ecology sense of self requires a further maturity and growth, an identification which goes beyond humanity to include the non-human world. The "real work" can be summarized symbolically as the realization of "self-in-Self" where "Self" stands for "organic wholeness" [Robinson Jeffers' phrase]. This process of the full unfolding of the self can also be summarized by the phrase, "No one is saved until we are all saved" (Devall & Sessions, 1985, pp. 66-67).

The idea that "no one is saved until we are all saved" is of course exemplified by the Buddhist ideal of the Bodhisattva, that is, a person who forgets the egoic self (and, without necessarily intending to, thereby realizes a more expansive sense of self) through working for the realization of others. In regard to this ideal, the Zen roshi and supporter of deep ecology, Robert Aitken, writes tersely:

As the world is going, the Bodhisattva ideal holds our only hope for survival or indeed for the survival of any species. The three poisons of greed, hatred and ignorance are destroying our natural and cultural heritage. I believe that unless we as citizens of the world can take the radical Bodhisattva position, we will not even die with integrity (Aitken, 1982, p. 62).

How then do we save all beings? "We save all beings by including them," says Aitken (p. 73). The Bodhisattva ideal represents the Buddhist equivalent of Naess's concept of Self-realization—a concept that, as we have seen, was itself deeply inspired by the work and ideas of the modern Bodhisattva, Mahatma Gandhi.

Alan Drengson:

Here is where "Deep Ecology" comes in. When we use the word "Deep Ecology" here, we are referring to the philosophical approach described by George Sessions, Bill Devall, Arne Naess, and others .... Using Naess's terminology, we can say that the follower of the Deep Ecology Way practices extended self-identifications ... [which] involves an extension of one's concerns, commitments, and political actions. This sense of extended caring was expressed well in Spinoza's observation that we are as large as our loves (Drengson, 1988, p. 22).

David Rothenberg:

When Arne begins his system with the norm "Self-realisation!" many associations will be raised. [However, Naess makes it clear]
that we are not meant to narrow this realisation to our own limited egos, but to seek an understanding of the widest "Self," one with a capital S that expands from each of us to include all (through the process of identification). . . . The word ["Self-realisation"] in Norwegian is Self-realising: Self-realising. It is an active condition, not a place one can reach. No one ever reaches Self-realisation, for complete Self-realisation would require the realisation of all. Just as no one in certain Buddhist traditions ever reaches nirvana, the rest of the world must be pulled along to get there. It is only a process, a way to live one's life (Rothenberg, 1989).

Andrew McLaughlin:

Ecology, understood narrowly as the study of the interrelations between nonhuman organisms and their environments, may not force a fundamental change in our image of nature. However, when this perspective is applied self-referentially, it does require a fundamentally new image of humanity and nature. If, instead of seeing nature as separate from humanity, we see humanity and nature as one matrix, then it is clear that we are a part of nature. Our relations to nature are internal, in the sense that we are as we are because of the larger context within which we exist. . . .

What the ecological image suggests is that the identification of the self with the biological being is a basic error, an undue limiting, and that an expanding identification with larger human and nonhuman communities is continuous with what we can know about our world. Ultimately, what the self in Self-realization refers to is the organic wholeness of which we are but an aspect (McLaughlin, 1985).

Freya Mathews:

Deep Ecology is concerned with the metaphysics of nature, and of the relation of self to nature. It sets up ecology as a model for the basic metaphysical structure of the world, seeing the identities of all things—whether at the level of elementary particles, organisms, or galaxies—as logically interconnected: all things are constituted by their relations with other things. . . .

Applying this principle of interconnectedness to the human case, it becomes apparent that the individual denoted by "I" is not constituted merely by a body or a personal ego or consciousness. I am, of course, partially constituted by these immediate physical and mental structures, but I am also constituted by my ecological relations with elements of my environment—relations in the image of which the structures of my body and consciousness are built. I am a holistic element of my native ecosystem, and of any wider wholes under which that ecosystem is subsumed.

From the point of view of deep ecology, what is wrong with our
culture is that it offers us an inaccurate conception of the self. It depicts the personal self as existing in competition with and in opposition to nature. . . . [We thereby fail to realize that] If we destroy our environment, we are destroying what is in fact our larger self (Mathews, 1988, pp. 349-50, 354).

John Livingston:

Now, my point in reporting all of this is not to apply one more layer of mystery (mysticism) to the wildlife experience, but rather to emphasize that when I say that the fate of the sea turtle or the tiger or the gibbon is mine, I mean it. All that is in my universe is not merely mine; it is me. And I shall defend myself, I shall defend myself not only against overt aggression but also against gratuitous insult ....

There is absolutely nothing unusual about this experience. Anyone who has ever loved a nonhuman being knows the extraordinarily encompassing sense of unity that is possible, at least occasionally. . . . All I ask here is that you allow yourself to extend this selfless "identification" - for that, essentially, is what it is - beyond those individuals that you "know" in the conventional sense [i.e., by personal acquaintance] (Livingston, 1982, pp. 113-14).

Neil Evernden:

For our purposes it is the notion that the self is not necessarily defined by the body surface that is especially interesting. This means that there is some kind of involvement with the realm beyond the skin, and that the self is more a sense of self-potency throughout a region than a purely physical presence. . . .

It has become apparent in the study of ethology that the extension of self into setting is by no means abnormal or unusual. The idea that an organism regards parts of its environment as belonging to its field of self seems strange only when we begin with the assumption that visual boundaries are more real than experiential boundaries. Our own sensation of personal space gives us some insight into the nature of self-extension, but of course the animal territory is not only larger but constitutes a fluctuating field. That is, while the area immediately around the self-center may always be regarded as a part of the individual, the extension of that image to dimensions large enough for us to notice and designate as territory varies with the mood of the organism. What we see in territoriality is the visible manifestation of what each of us goes through in sculpting a self. However, in this case we can see the gap between the boundary of the body and the boundary of the self. We cannot deny what we see in territorial animals, but our own less visible commitment to an extended self is easier to neglect. . . . [If one is open to experiencing this commitment then] one does not really experience the boundary of the self as the epidermis of the body, but rather as a gradient of involvement in the world. . . .
of concern or care. . . . If we were to regard ourselves as "fields of care" rather than as discrete objects in a neutral environment, our understanding of our relationship to the world might be fundamentally transformed (Evernden, 1985, pp. 43, 45, 64, 47).

Michael Zimmerman:

We are so entrenched in the contents of awareness that we fail to notice awareness or openness as such. Awareness itself, of course, is not a thing, but instead constitutes the open realm in which things can be revealed. Within the open realm of awareness, both ego-subject and objects can first reveal themselves and thus "be." This awareness is not the property of my ego; instead, the ego "belongs" to the open awareness. But we must not be misled by the metaphor of ownership. Awareness is not a thing that possesses another thing, "me." The point here is that human existence involves something more fundamental than the ego-subject. Heidegger suggests that a human being becomes "authentic" when released from the compulsive activity of the ego. When it is authentic, human existence functions to serve, not to dominate. In the moment of release, enlightenment, or authenticity, things do not dissolve into an undifferentiated mass. Instead, they stand out or reveal themselves in their own unique mode of Being. Aware of the Being of beings, authentic human existence is also profoundly aware of the beings as such. . . . These beings include not only animals, plants, mountains, stars, and other people-but also our own bodies, wishes, feelings, memories, hopes, and thoughts. When we are at home with our mortal openness, we no longer have to be enemies of the events—the pain, loss, and death—that occur within the clearing. If we no longer identify ourselves with the ego that craves security and gratification, we do not have to resist what things are, nor do we feel compelled to manipulate them solely to suit our desires (Zimmerman, 1985, pp. 252, 254).

Robert Aitken:

Deep ecology ... requires openness to the black bear, becoming truly intimate with the black bear, so that honey dribbles down your fur as you catch the bus to work (Aitken, 1980, p. 57).

John Seed:

As the implications of evolution and ecology are internalized and replace the outmoded anthropocentric structures in your mind, there is an identification with all life ... [Thus] "I am protecting the rain forest" develops to "I am part of the rain forest protecting myself. I am that part of the rain forest recently emerged into thinking (Seed, 1985, p. 243).

The fundamental problem may be who we as a species think we are. Who do we refer to, or mean, when we say "I"? We can't seem to
break into the actual realization of our true nature. We can study evolution and appreciate how we evolved over four hundred million years. We can trace in our physical appearance this immense old creature which is manifest in my body in the briefest manifestation. But some people, many people, have difficulty identifying with the whole process. It is only by identification with the whole process that correct values will emerge. Otherwise we see it as self-sacrifice or effort. In shallow ecology arguments we're always trying to balance jobs and environment. If we identify with the immense process . . . we see immediately our correct self-interest whereas the self-interest of the narrow ego in modern societies is mistaken self-interest (Seed, quoted in Devall, 1984b, p.6).

Joanna Macy:

The ecological perspective, then, as John Seed shows us, offers us a vaster sense of who and what we are. Systems cyberneticians like Gregory Bateson and Norbert Weiner remind us that all concepts setting boundaries to what we term the self are arbitrary. In the systems view, we consist of and are sustained by interweaving currents of matter, energy and information that flow through us interconnecting us with our environment and other beings. Yet, we are accustomed to identifying ourselves only with that small arc of the flow-through that is lit, like the narrow beam of a flashlight, by our individual Subjective awareness. But we don't have to so limit our self-perceptions .... It is as plausible to align our identity with [the] larger pattern, interexistent with all beings, as to break off one segment of the process and build our borders there (Macy, 1987, p. 20).

John Rodman:

Acts of Ecological Resistance are not undertaken primarily in the spirit of calculated, long-term self-interest (of the individual, the society, or the species), or in the spirit of obedience to a moral duty, or in the spirit of preventing profanation .... (Rather) Ecological Resistance . . . assumes a version of the theory of internal relations: the human personality discovers its structure through interaction with the non-human order. I am what I am at least partly in relation to my natural environment, and changes in that environment affect my own identity. If I stand idly by and let it be destroyed, a part of me is also destroyed or seriously deranged. An act of Ecological Resistance, then, is an affirmation of the integrity of a naturally diverse self-and-world, . . . Ecological Resistance thus has something of the character of a ritual action whereby one aligns the self with the ultimate order of things (Rodman, 1978, p. 54).

This consideration of the central views of the main writers on deep ecology (and those considered to be closely associated with them) should be enough to show that these writers are
distinguished from the mainstream of writers on ecophilosophy (i.e., intrinsic value theorists) by the fact that they agree not only with Naess's rejection of approaches that issue in moral "oughts" but also with the transpersonal, realization-of-as-expansive-a-sense-of-self-as-possible-approach that Naess advocates in preference to these approaches. Moreover, these writers generally look to Naess as the thinker who has elaborated these views in the greatest detail—or, at the very least, they align themselves with colleagues of Naess who in turn look to him in this way.

From my discussion here it should also be apparent that Rodman has developed his typology in such a way as to have come close to expressing similar ideas to Naess. That is, in Rodman's work one finds definite moves—rather than perhaps the odd hint—not only in the direction of rejecting approaches that issue in moral "oughts" but also in the direction of emphasizing the view that our sense of self can be as expansive as our identifications and that a realistic appreciation of the ways in which we are intimately bound up with the world around us inevitably leads to wider and deeper identification. However, it is nothing against the brilliance of Rodman's work to say that these particular ideas are elaborated in considerably greater detail in Naess's work. One can find them in Rodman's work if one knows what to look for. In contrast, Naess elaborates these views—and responds to the various questions that are raised by their discussion—over and over in his work.

Finally, in concluding this section, it is important to dispel a thoroughly misguided objection that can arise for some people when they first hear about the emphasis that Naess and his colleagues place upon the psychological process of identification. Specifically, the fact that transpersonal ecologists focus on the human capacity for, and experience of, wide and deep identification can lead some people to charge that this approach is anthropocentric. However, the problem here is that this represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the intended, evaluative sense of the term anthropocentric. Just as the terms sexist, racist, and imperialist, for example, are intended to refer to approaches that promote unwarranted differential treatment of people on the basis of their sex, race, or culture, so the term anthropocentric is intended to refer to approaches that promote unwarranted differential treatment of other entities on the basis of the extent to which they are considered to be human-like. It follows from these understandings that to say that transpersonal ecology is anthropocentric simply because it focuses on the human capacity for identification is as perverse a use of this term as it is to say that a group such as Men Overcoming Violent Emotions (MOVE) is sexist.
simply because it focuses on men. Rather, just as MOVE is wholly directed toward overcoming domestic violence in particular and sexist behavior in general, so transpersonal ecology is wholly directed toward overcoming the various forms of human chauvinism and domination. What is at issue, then, in deciding whether a particular approach is sexist, racist, imperialist, or anthropocentric is not the question of what class of entities the approach focuses on per se, but rather the intention that lies behind this focus of interest as well as its practical upshot. Seen in this light, it should be clear that transpersonal ecology's focus on the human capacity for, and experience of, wide and deep identification is not remotely anthropocentric in the intended, evaluative sense of that term.

PROOF, MORAL INJUNCTIONS, AND EXPERIENTIAL INVITATIONS

As we have seen, deep ecologists—or transpersonal ecologists—sometimes reject approaches that issue in moral "oughts" without offering any explanation; at other times they offer any of a number of different reasons (e.g., they may hold such approaches to constitute a superficial approach to the issues concerned or to be repressive or ineffective). However, my analysis of the kind of self that is emphasized by approaches that issue in moral "oughts" suggests that the most fundamental reason for the fact that transpersonal ecologists reject these approaches is that these thinkers explicitly emphasize a wide, expansive, or field-like conception of self, whereas advocates of approaches that issue in moral "oughts" necessarily emphasize a narrow, atomistic, or particle-like conception of self—whether they intend to do this or not. If this view is correct, then transpersonal ecologists consider these approaches to be superficial, repressive, or ineffective precisely because they emphasize a limited and limiting conception of self.

This rejection of approaches that issue in moral "oughts" explains a peculiar and, for many, a particularly frustrating fact about the transpersonal ecology approach. Specifically, the fact that transpersonal ecologists are not in the business of wanting to claim that their conclusions are morally binding on others means that they do not attempt to prove the correctness of their approach. They present their approach as a realistic, positive option (i.e., as an approach that one can take and that one might want to take) rather than as a logically or morally established obligation (i.e., as an approach with which one ought to comply). Taking Naess as the exemplar of the transpersonal ecology approach, we see that he continually puts his views forward in a manner that invites the reader's interest rather than in a manner that demands the reader's
compliance. Thus, for example, Naess introduces the lengthy chapter that outlines his ideas on Self-realization and identification in *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle*, by saying,

In this chapter a basic positive attitude to nature is articulated in philosophical form. It is not done to win compliance, but to offer some of the many who are at home in such a philosophy new opportunities to express it in words (Naess, 1989, p. 164).

Again, when discussing the concept of Self-realization in a Spinozist context, Naess begins with this introduction:

In what follows I do not try to prove anything. I invite the reader to consider a set of connections between Spinoza’s *Ethics* and the trend in thinking and living inspired in part by ecology and sometimes called the *deep ecological movement*. Most of the connections seem clear to me, but each needs to be carefully scrutinized (Naess, 1982).

And finally, when expressing his views on the purpose of philosophical discussion in a more general context, Naess says:

Concluding this introduction I invite you to try to understand rather than to try to find weaknesses of exposition and argument. We are, I presume, all of us here as seekers, *zetetlcs* or “sceptics” in the good sense of Sextus Empiricus. We do not wish to impose any doctrines upon anybody. . . . We look for helpful cooperation rather than for opportunity to preach (Naess, 1978, p. 30).

Naess’s writings are characterized by comments of this kind—comments to the effect that he is only meaning to put his views forward in a “tentative” manner. This stance differs markedly from that of intrinsic value theorists for the following reason. Intrinsic value theorists need to establish the correctness of their arguments for intrinsic value as best they can if their arguments are to have any normative force, that is, if their arguments are to be considered as carrying any moral (i.e., morally obliging) weight. If intrinsic value theorists are unable to establish the correctness of their arguments for intrinsic value successfully, then the ”oughts” in which these arguments issue are not considered to be morally compelling; their arguments are said to ”fail.” In contrast, however, there is a theoretical reason why transpersonal ecologists do not attempt to prove the correctness of their approach in such a way that their conclusions are morally binding on others. This is because to attempt to do this would be to reinforce the primary reality of the narrow, atomistic, or particle-like volitional self. Rather than dealing in moral *injunctions*, transpersonal ecologists are therefore inclined far more to what might be referred to as experiential *invitations*: readers or listeners are invited to...
experience themselves as intimately bound up with the world
around them, bound up to such an extent that it becomes more
or less impossible to refrain from wider identification (i.e.,
impossible to refrain from the this-worldly realization of a
more expansive sense of self).

From a phenomenological point of view, we could say that
moral demands—even moral demands to realize a more
expansive sense of self—are experienced (at least in the first
instance) as forceful and constricting. They are experienced as
forces that impinge upon (from the Latin impingere, meaning
to drive at, dash against) us, where us refers to our narrow,
votional sense of self. We can therefore depict these moral
forces as vectors or arrows that point in toward our narrow,
votional sense of self. In contrast, invitations to experience a
more expansive sense of self are experienced from the
beginning as nonforceful and potentially liberating. This
situation can best be depicted not as arrows or lines of force
that point out from “us,” since this could also suggest that such
invitations are forceful in some normative sense, but rather
simply as doors, gates, or barriers (representing the limits of
our narrow, atomistic, particle-like sense of self) that have been
opened—or even removed. Can we resist taking a stroll
outside? That is, as our knowledge grows regarding the extent
to which we are intimately bound up with the world, can we
resist identifying more widely and deeply with the world (i.e.,
realizing a more expansive sense of self) such that we are
naturally inclined to care for all aspects of the world’s
unfolding?

Some philosophers are bound to feel uneasy about this
invitational as opposed to injunctive approach to ecophiloso-
phy. Some are likely to claim that transpersonal ecologists do
not deserve to be taken seriously precisely because they do not
attempt to prove their arguments in such a way that their
conclusions are morally binding on others. On the other hand,
others are likely to claim that transpersonal ecologists do
attempt to smuggle a moral “ought” into their conclusions. For
these philosophers, transpersonal ecologists are effectively
deriving an ought from an is when they link the fact of our
interconnectedness with the world to the response of wider and
deeper identification. In regard to the first objection, one
quickly reaches an impasse. Transpersonal ecologists can only
reiterate that there is a theoretical reason for the fact that they
do not attempt to prove their arguments in such a way that their
conclusions are morally binding on others and for the fact that
they reject approaches that do attempt to do this. This reason
turns on the different kinds of self that are emphasized in
transpersonal ecology on the one hand and approaches that
issue in moral "oughts" on the other. Moreover, this theoretical reason enables transpersonal ecologists to criticize approaches that issue in moral "oughts" (namely, for emphasizing a narrow, atomistic, or particle-like sense of self) just as vigorously as advocates of these approaches may wish to criticize the approach of transpersonal ecology. The nature of the differences between these contrasting points of view is such that they should properly be regarded as alternative ecophilosophical paradigms. This means that the choice between them may not be a function of which is the more "correct" (since they work from different assumptions and incorporate different kinds of facts) so much as a function of other kinds of criteria such as which is the more fruitful to the discussion of ecophilosophical problems, which is the more relevant to our experience, which is the more exciting or appealing to certain kinds of temperaments, which is the more easily communicated, which is the more likely to influence behavior, and so on.

The second objection (i.e., that transpersonal ecologists are effectively deriving an ought from an is when they link our interconnectedness with the world to the response of wider and deeper identification) is simply wrong. Transpersonal ecologists claim that ecology, and modern science in general, provides a compelling account of our interconnectedness with the world. However, they are not in the business of attempting to claim that this fact logically implies that we ought to care about the world. The fact of our interconnectedness with the world does not logically imply either that we ought to care about the world of which we are a part or that we ought not to care about it. Logic, in other words, is of no help to us either way in proceeding from the fact of our interconnectedness with the world to the practical question of how we should live. Accordingly, transpersonal ecologists are not concerned with the question of the logical connection between the fact that we are intimately bound up with the world and the question of how we should behave but rather with the psychological connection between this fact and our behavior. Their analysis of the self is such that they consider that if one has a deep understanding of the way things are (i.e., if one empathically incorporates the fact that we and all other entities are aspects of a single unfolding reality), then one will (as opposed to should) naturally be inclined to care for the unfolding of the world in all its aspects. For transpersonal ecologists, this kind of response to the fact of our interconnectedness with the world represents a natural [i.e., spontaneous] unfolding of human potentialities. Indeed, given a deep enough understanding of this fact, we can scarcely refrain from responding in this way. This is why one finds transpersonal ecologists making statements to the effect that they are more concerned with ontology or cosmology (i.e.,
A distinctive approach to ecophilosophy

We have seen, then, that transpersonal ecology constitutes a distinctive approach to ecophilosophy in that it emphasizes a fundamentally different kind of self to the kinds of self that are emphasized by instrumental and intrinsic value theory approaches. Understanding this fact enables us to see why transpersonal ecologists reject approaches that issue in moral "oughts" (and this, of course, includes intrinsic value theory approaches of the kind discussed in the previous chapter) and why they do not attempt to prove the correctness of their views in such a way that their conclusions are morally binding on others. In both cases, the reason is that they are not interested in supporting approaches that serve to reinforce the primary reality of the narrow, atomistic, or particle-like volitional self. For transpersonal ecologists, given a deep enough understanding of the way things are, the response of being inclined to care for the unfolding of the world in all its aspects follows "naturally" -not as a logical consequence but as a psychological consequence; as an expression of the spontaneous unfolding (development, maturing) of the self.

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