INTRODUCTION

This article deals with certain fundamental patterns in ontogenetic development, particularly as they relate to transpersonal psychology, cartographies of consciousness, and developmental hierarchies. The issues themselves, however, are rather abstruse, and take as their genesis certain recalcitrant problems in orthodox developmental psychology. Since I do not wish the initial abstruseness of the issues to hide their relevance, I would like to begin with a rather didactic introduction, using a few analogies to convey the overall drift of the subsequent and more precise discussion.

One of the simplest facts of human ontogeny seems to be this: as various structures, processes, and functions emerge in the course of development, some of them remain in existence, some of them pass. For example, the need for food—the oral/anal alimentary structure—develops in the very earliest stages of development; so does the oral stage of psychosexual development. The need for food remains; the oral stage passes (barring fixation/repression). One never outgrows the need for food; one ideally outgrows the oral stage.

That is by no means an isolated example; in fact, as a crude approximation, it appears that about half of development remains in existence (even if modified), and about half is lost, or passes. In cognitive development, for instance, once a capacity emerges and matures—whether an image, a symbol, a concept, or a rule—it is by and large retained; the higher cognitive structures generally subsume and incorporate the lower ones. In moral development, however, the higher stages do not so much include the lower as replace the lower. The lower struc-
structures seem essentially to be dissolved or negated. The former might be called basic structures; the latter, transition or replacement structures.

As a simple analogy of how both basic and transition structures might operate in development, take the growth of the United States by annexation of new territories. Hawaii, for example, used to be a sovereign and autonomous nation itself. It possessed its own sense of "selfhood"-or nationality-sand its own basic geographical structures (land, rivers, mountains, etc.). When the U.S. annexed Hawaii and eventually made it into a state, two fundamental things happened: the basic geography of Hawaii remained unchanged, and was simply incorporated as part of the U.S. The nationality of Hawaii, however-its existence as an exclusive nation-was simply and completely dissolved. It was replaced by U.S. nationality. From that point on, Hawaii could no longer (legally) declare war on other countries, make treaties, engage in international relations, etc.

In that analogy there are three fundamental phenomena: the basic geographical structures, the function of nationality, and the replacement stages of actual nationality identities. I am suggesting that some similar phenomena occur in human growth and development. The basic structures of human ontogeny are like the basic geographical features-seven as growth includes more and more territories, the old ones are not abandoned but included. Some of the basic structures of human development seem to be physical body, emotional body, mind, archetypal-subtle, and causal spirit (as I will explain). The self-system in human ontogeny is like nationality-sit seems to include such basic functions as defense mechanisms ("war"), sense of identity, interpersonal relations, and so on. And the actual stages of self (e.g. moral) development are like the stages in the growth of nationality-as a new one emerges, it negates, dissolves, and replaces the old one (barring fixation! repression).

These distinctions seem to be significant for several reasons, which I will suggest throughout this paper. For example, I will argue that the yoga chakras are basic structures but that Maslow's hierarchical needs are replacement structures, and trying to equate them leads to theoretical difficulties. Likewise, the psychological dynamics of basic and replacement structures seem to be fundamentally different, a factor of apparently decisive importance in psychopathology. This theory also seems to suggest a rather clean way to fit Eastern concepts of levels of consciousness with Western concepts of stages of development. Finally, this overall approach has specific implications for developmental psychology in general and meditative-transpersonal psychology in particular.
Developmental psychologists are faced with two fundamental tasks. The first is to determine, as accurately as possible, the data of the human life cycle (ontogenetic development) in particular, the chronological sequence of the emergence of the various psychological structures, systems, and processes. The second is to suggest (and then test) hypothetical connections that might account for this temporal ordering. One theoretical approach to these problems that I have found useful is to differentiate between at least two broad categories of developmental psychological phenomena, each possessing two sub-sets (compare Piaget [1977], and especially Flavell [1970]):

Transition structures—(Where A and B appear to be different developmental phenomena) A precedes B but "disappears" after B's emergence.

Preliminary—A is a preliminary version of B. In this case, A constitutes merely the early "learning" steps in the perfection of B, and A disappears as B is perfected (or A gives way to B).

Replacement—A is not merely a preliminary version of B; B is of a significantly different order of response which substitutes for or fundamentally replaces A. A is for all practical purposes lost, and B takes its place.

Basic Structures—A precedes B but remains in existence after B appears.

Incorporation—A is incorporated in B. Once A is more or less developed, it serves as an ingredient, subpart, or element of B (when B emerges). A remains largely intact even as it is incorporated in B.

Mediation—A mediates B. The relation of A to B is that of means to end. A is not necessarily a preliminary version of B, nor is it necessarily incorporated by E, nor is it simply replaced by B. It mediates the emergence and development of B without itself necessarily becoming involved beyond that point. A remains in existence.

This list is not exhaustive. Further, it must be emphasized that "exact definitions of and distinctions among (the four types of relation listed above) remain vague and uncertain and so, consequently, does the assignment of instances to each" (Flavell, 1970).

At the very least, it seems that there are clear differences between basic structures and transition structures. This distinction may seem elemental enough, but as Flavell (1970) points out, "There has been surprisingly little attention given
In this paper I intend to focus on the fundamental differences between basic structures and transition structures and show that they underscore two fundamentally different types or sequences of human growth and development. In particular, I will suggest that such psychological phenomena as sensation, perception, emotion, cognition, archetype, etc., are basic structures of consciousness, whereas moral sense, modes of self, Maslow's needs hierarchy, etc., are merely transition-replacement structures in consciousness. Attempting to equate these two different patterns of growth leads to severe conceptual difficulties but, I will suggest that the two are nonetheless intimately related, since the former serves as a developmental substrate for the latter.

As an introductory example of these differences, we may point to the work of Piaget and Kohlberg. Piaget (1977) has demonstrated that cognitive development proceeds through four major stage/structures: sensorimotor, preoperational thinking ("preop"), concrete operational thinking ("conop"), and formal operational thinking ("formop"). Significantly, each of these cognitive structures is necessary for, and actively contributes to, its successor's operations. Thus, sensorimotor cognition provides the raw data for preop and conop thinking, which in turn provides the material for formop logic. The point is that, even though sensorimotor intelligence emerges and is tentatively well developed by age 2, it does not then cease to be active or important but rather continues to exist and function. Besides its own appropriate activities, it also contributes to and is incorporated in higher structures of consciousness. This is a good example of what all basic structures have in common: once they emerge, they "remain."

Kohlberg's studies, on the other hand, are largely examples of stage-specific replacement structures. Kohlberg (1963) has demonstrated that an individual's sense of morality develops through (at least) six major stages. Most importantly, once a person has reached a particular stage—say # 5—he or she virtually ceases all responses characteristic of the lower stages—in this case, stages # 1 through # 4 (only 25% stage 4 responses, virtually 0% stage 1, 2, or 3 responses). While each junior stage
is necessary for the development of its senior, the junior stages are not incorporated by the senior stages but rather are almost totally replaced by them (a point clearly suggested by Flavell [1970]). That is a good example of transition-replacement structures: the lower is a precursor of the higher but is not an ingredient of the higher—it emerges only to be replaced, not incorporated.

In a sense, then, the basic structures are stages of development that are never outgrown; the transition structures are stages that are outgrown; the former are stages that remain as structures, the latter, structures that serve basically as stages. Both of them display structure and stage attributes, but with different emphasis. For this reason I will usually refer to the former as basic structures (although they also emerge in stages) and the latter as transition stages (although they are also temporary structures).

This paper is an extract-summary of sections from a theoretical work-in-progress tentatively entitled, System, Self; and Structure: An Outline Text of Transpersonal Psychology. Thus, its conceptualizations are necessarily streamlined, generalized, and condensed. This presentation is divided into three sections. The first deals with the basic structures of consciousness and their development—body, mind, subtle, causal, etc. The third deals with the major replacement structures of consciousness—moral stages, self-stages, Maslow's needs hierarchy, etc. The second section, "Characteristics of Self," discusses what I propose as the theoretical link between them.

THE BASIC STRUCTURES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Figure I is a schematic presentation of some of the basic structures of consciousness as suggested in System, Self, and Structure (see also Wilber, 1980a). This schema, up to and including vision-logic, is based explicitly on the works of Piaget (1977), Werner (1964), Arieti (1967), and Baldwin (1975). The higher levels, which I have condensed here from five or six levels into two general realms, the subtle and the causal, are based largely on Hindu and Buddhist psychological systems and especially their modern interpreters, e.g., Aurobindo, Guenon (1945), Smith (1976) (see Wilber, 1980a).

This schema suggests that there are vertical developments between levels as well as horizontal developments within each level (the former I call "transformation"; the latter, "translation"). Further, each level or basic structure seems to have a fairly circumscribed date of emergence, or chronological
starting point, but no necessarily circumscribed end point of development. Thus, for example, formop thinking generally emerges around age twelve, but it can be further developed and exercised throughout one's entire life. The important point is not so much when it can be said to be "perfected," but rather that it rarely appears in any form prior to early adolescence. It is the emergent point, not the end point, that most helps us to locate a process on the hierarchy of structural organization (although that is by no means the only criterion; see Wilber, 1980c). In the schema of Fig. 1, I have therefore listed, at their branch points, some generally accepted dates of the first emergence of the various structures (see Piaget, 1977; Werner, 1964; Blanck & Blanck, 1974; Flavell, 1970; Arieti, 1967).

The dates of the three most senior levels are set in parentheses because they do not yet seem to be determined collectively. Piaget has demonstrated that, barring extreme abnormality, most individuals will reach a capacity for formal-operational consciousness, or the reflexive-formal mind. But individuals today do not develop automatically beyond that point into the
transpersonal regions of subtle, causal, or ultimate transcendence. My tentative hypothesis to account for this (Wilber, 1981) is that mankind on the whole has, up to this point in history, collectively evolved to the level of formop thinking, and therefore each individual born today is more-or-less assured of developing to that level. Beyond that level, however, development is more an individual matter. Conceivably, as more individuals strive for and reach the higher levels, as our ancestors fought for the capacity to reason, then these higher levels will be collectively bequeathed to subsequent progeny, and so on.

One of the advantages of this type of branching-tree schema (first suggested by Werner, 1964) is that it clearly allows for the chronological development of and hierarchical ordering between the basic structures, without in any way denying ongoing and often parallel development within them. For example, the reflexive mind is of a higher level of structural organization than, say, the phantasmic or simple image mind, and the reflexive mind always emerges after the phantasmic mind—but the phantasmic level itself can still display significant development even as and while the reflexive mind is emerging and maturing. This occurs because once a basic structure emerges, then, as was suggested earlier, it remains in existence simultaneously with the subsequent higher structures; since it does remain, it can be continuously and simultaneously developed and exercised. Significantly, this is not the case with transition or replacement structures. A person at level-5 moral development does not simultaneously develop his or her capacity to be a level-1 scoundrel. These levels, being replacements, are mutually exclusive.

The curved area marked "a" on the branches in Fig. 1 represents the earliest stages of a particular lever's emergence and consolidation. As such, "a" is a form of preliminary-transition structure. Although I will not dwell on these structures in this paper, they are important developmental processes, especially as regards early fixations or deviations (e.g., the early stages of emotional-sexual development).

It remains to give a brief description of the basic structures themselves.

1. Physical-the simple physical substratum of the organism (e.g., the first Buddhist skandha).
2. Sensoriperceptual—here I am treating sensation, the second skandha, and perception, the third, as one general realm.
3. Emotional-sexual—the sheath of bioenergy, libido, clan
vital, or prana (*pranamayakosa* in Vedanta, the fourth *skandha* in Buddhism).

4. Phantasmio-Arieti's term for the lower or image mind; the simplest form of mental "picturing" using only images (Arieti, 1967).

5. Rep-mind-an abbreviation for "representational mind," or Piaget's preoperational thinking. One of the most striking features of representational or preoperational thinking is that it cannot easily take the role of other. It can represent the other with symbols, particularly words, but it cannot represent the role or view of the other. It is, as Piaget would say, still very egocentric (Piaget, 1977).

6. Rule/role mind-this is Piaget's concrete operational thinking. Conop thinking, unlike its rep-mind predecessor, can take the role of others. It is also the first structure that can clearly perform rule operations, such as multiplication, division, class inclusion, etc. (Flavell, 1970; Piaget, 1977).

7. Formal-reflexive mind-this is Piaget's formal operational thinking. It is the first structure that can not only think about the world but think about thinking; hence, it is the first structure that is clearly self-reflexive and introspective (although this begins in rudimentary form with the rule/role mind). It is also the first structure capable of hypothetico-deductive or propositional reasoning ("if a, then b"), which allows it to apprehend higher or noetic relationships (Flavell, 1970; Piaget, 1977).

8. Vision-logic-where the formal-mind establishes higher relationships, vision-logic establishes networks of those relationships. The point is to place each proposition alongside numerous others, so as to be able to see, or "to vision," how the truth or falsity of anyone proposition would affect the truth or falsity of the others. Such panoramic or vision logic apprehends a mass network of ideas, how they influence each other and interrelate. It is thus the beginning of truly higher-order synthesizing capacity, of making connections, relating truths, coordinating ideas, integrating concepts. It culminates in what Aurobindo called "the higher mind," which "can freely express itself in single ideas, but its most characteristic movement is a mass ideation, a system or totality of truth-seeing at a single view; the relations of idea with idea, of truth with truth ... self-seen in the integral whole." This, obviously, is a highly integrative structure; indeed, in my opinion it is the highest integrative structure in the personal realm; beyond it lie transpersonal developments.
9. Subtle—For the simplified purposes of this paper, we may regard the subtle as the general region of archetypal patterns or trans-individual forms. According to various traditions, it is the home of Platonic form, audible-illuminations (nada or shabd), saintly revelations of truth and light, deity-forms, ishtadeva, archangelic intuition, classical savikalpasamadhi, etc. (Guenon, 1945; Deutsche, 1969; Smith, 1976; Wilber, 1980a).

10. Causal—This is the unmanifest source or transcendental ground of all the lesser structures, what Aurobindo called the "overmind." It is realized in a state of consciousness known variously as nirvikalpa samadhi (Hinduism), nirodh (Theravada Buddhism), jnana samadhi (Vedanta), and the eighth of the ten ox-herding pictures (Zen) (Deutsche, 1969; Bubba Free John, 1977; Wilber, 1980a).

II. Ultimate—Passing fully through the state of cessation or unmanifest absorption, consciousness is said finally to re-awaken to its absolutely prior and eternal abode as spirit, radiant and all-pervading, one and many, only and all. This is classical sahaj samadhi. Aurobindo's "supermind," transcendental and unqualifiable consciousness as such. By analogy the paper on which Fig. 1 is drawn represents this fundamental ground of empty suchness (sunyata-tatbatav (Suzuki, 1968; Bubba Free John, 1977; Wilber, 1980a).

These are some of the basic structures of consciousness. Once they emerge in the course of development, they remain in existence, not only fulfilling their own functions and carrying out their own tasks, but also contributing to or even acting as ingredients of their senior structures. Although they can continue to grow, they are never outgrown.

CHARACTERISTICS OF SELF

Perhaps the most striking feature of the basic structures of consciousness presented here is that each one is devoid of self. To no branch of the structural tree in Fig. 1 can you point and say, there is the ego, or there is the self-sense, there is the feeling of personal "me-ness!" The reason, I am suggesting, is that each of those basic structures is inherently without self-sense, but, in the course of development, a self-system emerges and takes as its successive substrates the basic structures of consciousness. In a sense, the basic structures form rungs in a ladder upon which the self-system then climbs: matter to body to mind to subtle to causal to spirit. As the self "steps up" each higher rung in the ladder, it generates a set of transition-
replacement structures, i.e., those structures that are not a permanent part of the ladder but rather are temporarily generated by the self at each rung in the ladder and thus necessarily discarded (replaced) at the next rung.

However, no single rung of the ladder, nor any combination of them, can be said to constitute an inherent self. This is similar to the Buddhist notion of the five skandhas (compare with Fig. 1): the physical body, sensation-perception, emotion-impulse, lower cognition, and higher cognition (Gard, 1962). Each of these capacities is said to be anatta, or without self, yet each (temporarily and unavoidably) serves as a substrate of the self-sense. When the self-sense passes through and beyond the skandha-stnicues, and thus ceases to exist in itself, the result is nirvana, or selflessradiance, in which the skandhas continue to function but without the distortions of personalization. Essentially the same idea is found in the psychology of the yoga chakras, the Vedanta sheaths, and the Mahayana vijnanas. Each system maintains that there are several basic structures, sheaths or chakras that are fundamentally without separate self-sense, evidenced by the fact that, for example, the enlightened sage has access to all the basic structures—e.g., physical, emotional, mental, subtle—but he or she is not exclusively identified with or bound to them. There are structures of consciousness but no separate self in consciousness (see Guenon, 1945; Gard, 1962; Suzuki, 1968, Aurobindo).

This suggests that the self-system, although ultimately illusory, nonetheless serves an absolutely necessary if intermediate function, namely, it is the vehicle of development, growth, and transcendence. Or, to return to our simplistic metaphor, the self is the climber of the rungs in the ladder of structural organization, a climb destined to release the self from itself, "lest the last judgment come and find me unannihilate," said Blake, "and I be siez'd and giv'n into the hands of my own selfhood."

The self-system, then, even if ultimately illusory, seems intermediately necessary, appropriate, and functional. This fact justifies a close examination of "self-psychology," a phrase first used widely by Maslow to describe his endeavors. Only in the past few decades has self-psychology—the study of what the self is, its functions, constituents, and developments—begun to receive serious attention. According to Brandt (1980), "Only in the last twenty years has there been a shift in psychology back to the subject's consciousness of self." Spearheaded by such theorists as G. H. Mead (1934), H. S. Sullivan (1953), Fairbairn (1954), Hartman (1958), Rogers (1961), Erikson (1963), Maslow (1968), Branden (1971), Loevinger (1976), and Kohut...
(1977), the study of the nature and function of the self-system has recently become of paramount importance. Indeed, the significance of self-psychology might be indicated by the fact that the claim has already been made that "Kohut and Chicago are the modern equivalents of Freud and Vienna" Kohut being the author of the landmark book, The Restoration of the Self (Brandt, 1980).

All I wish to do in this section is suggest, on the basis of the above-mentioned theorists, what seem to be some of the major characteristics of the self-system. We might note that such psychologist-philosophers as Hume and James felt that the self-sense was connected to memory, or the capacity to connect and organize this moment around the preceding moment, i.e., to appropriate the preceding moment by the succeeding one. For James, the innermost self- "the Self of selves"-consisted of "successive acts of appropriation, sustained for as long as one can sustain them" (James, 1950).

This definition-the self as locus of appropriation-can of course be used in a perverse fashion-to explain the self by explaining it away (as both Hume and James ended up doing). The idea is that, since the self is "merely" the act of this moment's appropriation of the preceding moment, there is no self, only a "stream of consciousness," evidenced by the fact that the self never sees itself as subject, but always and only as a stream of objects.

The problem with this theory is that the act of appropriation itself does not entirely enter the stream, and thus neither does the self. The fact that the self cannot see itself does not necessarily mean there is no self, just as the fact that the eye does not see itself does not mean there is no eye. The self, as intermediate seer of the stream, is not necessarily part of the stream, at least not as entirely as Hume supposed. As appropriator of the stream, the self is constituted by functions other than the stream, and those functions are a legitimate field of study and research. Thus, as Brandt (1980) points out, it was only after this gap (or dead-end) in the Hume-James approach became evident that the study of self-psychology could proceed in earnest.

One of the characteristics of the self, then, might be the capacity to appropriate and organize the stream of psychological events in meaningful ways (and not merely to fall into it). This is not very different from the modern psychoanalytic viewpoint which defines the self as "the process of organizing." Beginning with Freud's The Ego and the Id (1961), and passing on to Fairbairn (1954), Heinz Hartmann (1958), Edith
In the same way and for the same reasons, the self might be viewed as the **locus of identification**. This is perhaps the most cogent definition or characteristic of the self-system. The self, in appropriating and organizing the stream of structural events, creates for itself a *selective identity* in the midst of those occasions. This seems perfectly normal and appropriate— we need only think of the disastrous results of the incapacity to form a stable personal identity (e.g., Erikson’s “identity crisis”), or the breakdown of personal identity in borderline psychoses (see Kernberg, 1967, 1971). As a simple generalization, then, we may speak of the self as the locus of identification as well as the center of the sense of identity—the intuitive apprehension of proximate “I-ness” which correlates with the act of appropriation.

Finally, the self might be thought of as the navigator of development, for at any point on the ladder of basic structures (except the two end limits), the self is faced with several different "directional pulls." On the one hand, it can (within limits) choose to remain on its present level of structural organization, or it can choose to release its present level in favor of another. If it releases its present level, it can move up the hierarchy or it can move down. On a given level, then, the self is faced with preservation vs. negation, holding on vs. letting go, living that level vs. dying to that level, identifying with it vs. dis-identifying from it. *Between* levels the self is faced with ascent vs. descent, moving up the hierarchy to levels of increasing structural organization and integration, or moving down to less organized and integrative structures. I have already written extensively on these "four directions" and pointed out how they relate to (and help explain) Freud’s *Eros* and *Thanatos*, the Christian *agape* (Buddhist *karunay*; Jung’s *phobos* (fear of death and negation), Hegel’s definition of transformation-ascent (“To supersede is at once to negate and to preserve”), the notion of descent or regression (a negation without preservation), and so on (Wilber, 1980a). For our simpler purposes, I think the general meanings of these four
factors are rather intuitively obvious, and we can simply display them as follows:

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<th>ascendent</th>
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<td>release</td>
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<td>descendant</td>
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The self is located, so to speak, at the crossroads of the display. It must balance the two dilemmas—preserve/release and ascend/descend—and navigate its developmental course by those four compass points. The self does not merely float down the stream of consciousness. For better or worse, it pushes and pulls, holds on and lets go, ascends and descends, steers and navigates. How the self as "navigator" handles the resultant tensions and functional dilemmas appears to be a large part of the story of self-development and self-pathology.

Now, if the self is indeed the locus of organization, identification, and navigation, then we might expect the course of self-development to include the following: as each of the basic structures begin chronologically to emerge and develop, the self would appropriate those structures or identify with them (the self as the locus of identification). Once identified with a structure, the self, or the self's preservation drive (factor #3), would seek to consolidate and integrate the resultant overall self-complex (self plus appropriated basic-structure). This initial identification, consolidation, and preservation seems normal and necessary (Wilber, 1980a).

If, however, the self as self is to ascend the hierarchy of structural organization to grow-alien eventually it must release or negate its exclusive identification with the lower level (or levels) in order to allow a higher identification with more senior levels of structural organization. It must accept the "death," negation, or release (factor #4) of the lower level-it must dis-identify with or detach from an exclusive involvement with that level in order to ascend (factor #1) to the greater life, unity, and integration of the next higher level (or levels) of the self and disidentification.

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structural organization. Once on the new level, the self then seeks to consolidate, fortify, and preserve the self-complex of that level (via factor #3), until it is once again strong enough to accept the death of that level, release or negate it, and so ascend to the next developmental level (Wilber, 1980a).

Thus, both preservation and negation, or life and death, apparently have important phase-specific tasks to accomplish. It is by the preservation-drive that a given level is appropriated, developed, consolidated, and integrated, for only by making a level "its own" can the self intimately organize it. Once that task is accomplished, however, it is only by negation that the self can die to its exclusive identification with that level and thus ascend to the next higher integration. Pathology seems to develop if either (or both) of these phase-specific tasks are misnavigated. For example, fixation might be thought of as a failure to release, negate, dis-identify, or die to a given level-the individual remains obsessed with gratifications he or she ought otherwise to have "outgrown" (e.g., food, sex, power). On the other hand, repression might be viewed as a type of premature death: is dis-identifying with a component before it is properly integrated, appropriated, and consolidated. The component is thus merely split off from the personality. The necessary dis-identification process becomes merely perverse dissociation (Wilber, 1980a).

In normal development, the phase-specific task of dis-identification from a given level seems to serve an extremely important function, namely, to denude that level of self (since self is the locus of identification). This phase-specific dis-identification does not destroy the level or the basic structure itself, but merely releases it from being the intermediately necessary substrate of the separate-self sense and returns it to its prior state of anatta, or selfless function and service. To return to our ladder metaphor: at each stage of growth, as the self steps from a lower rung to a higher, the rungs of the ladder are not destroyed, deformed, or discarded. What is destroyed is the self's exclusive attachment to that rung.

We are now in a position to examine those transition-replacement structures. In particular, what we will examine are the various self-stages constructed by a series of exclusive identifications with the hierarchic levels of structural organization or basic structures. These "exclusivity structures" last as long as the self-attachment to the particular basic structure lasts. Once that identification is released, that exclusivity structure is destroyed.
THE EXCLUSIVITY (OR SELF) STAGES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The overall suggestion of this section is that if one takes the hierarchy of basic structures as presented in Fig. 1, and then subjects each level to the influence of a self-system (whose characteristics I summarized above), one will generate the basic features of the stages of development presented and described by researchers such as Maslow, Loevinger, and Kohlberg. It is almost a process of simple mathematical mapping—e.g., if the self is the seat of identification, what would the self look like if it identified with the emotional-sexual level? with the rule/role mind? with the formal mind? with the subtle? By asking that question for each of the basic structures, we can generate, in precisely the same order and with quite similar descriptions, the stages of Kohlberg's moral development, Loevinger's ego development, and Maslow's needs hierarchy (to cite only the three examples I have chosen for this presentation).

I am suggesting 1) that the hierarchical stages presented by Loevinger, Kohlberg, and Maslow (also Peck, 1960; Erikson, 1963; Bull, 1969; Selman, 1974; Broughton, 1975) are referring to various aspects of essentially similar replacement-transition structures, and 2) that these particular types of replacement-transition structures are generated primarily by the enzyme of self-system acting on the substrate of basic structure. Since they are generated when the self's locus of identification centers exclusively on successive basic structures, they can also be called exclusivity structures.

Claim # 1 is put in its strong form by Loevinger (1976): "There is but one major source for all the conceptions of moral and ego [self] development, one thread of reality to which all of the conceptions give varying access." But, to my mind, there is much room for latitude here, and I would prefer to make my own point with the weaker claim of similarity. Kohlberg (1963, 1969), for example, feels that self-development is somewhat prior to moral development, and Selman (1974) feels that self-interpersonal development is a deep structure against which moralization occurs as surface structure.

In addition to those (minor) differences, there are also variations in the comprehensiveness of the various theories I am correlating. Thus, for each one of Maslow's stages, Loevinger has two (as does Kohlberg, up to a point). It might be that Loevinger is presenting sub-stages; it might be that Maslow was inadvertently lumping different stages together, but that is not our concern for the moment. In all of these cases-the
<table>
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<th>BASIC STRUCTURES</th>
<th>MASLOW</th>
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<td>Reflexive mind</td>
<td>Self-esteem</td>
<td>Conscientious</td>
<td>III. Postconventional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vision-logic</td>
<td>Self-actualization</td>
<td>Individualistic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtle</td>
<td>Self-transcendence</td>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>5. Individual rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causal</td>
<td>Self-transcendence</td>
<td>Integrated</td>
<td>6. Individual principles of conscience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ultimate</td>
<td>Self-transcendence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 3. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN BASIC STRUCTURES AND VARIOUS ASPECTS OF EXCLUSIVITY STAGES (MASLOW, LOEVINGER, AND KOHLBERG)
relation of self and moral sense, the number and types of stages and substages, etc.-future research alone will decide the issues. Here we need only the already acknowledged fundamental similarities between these theories to make the general point.

The correlations between the basic structures of consciousness and the hierarchic stages of Maslow, Loevinger, and Kohlberg are presented in Figure 3. The correlations between Maslow, Loevinger, and Kohlberg are basically provided by Loevinger (1976) herself; further, the correlations between the Piagetian basic (cognitive) structures and the stages of Kohlberg and Loevinger have been suggested by Breger (1974) and by Habermas. In any case, these correlations are not merely my own readings of the data. Until research techniques are refined, however, these authorities generally acknowledge that such correlations are open to errors of ± one stage. Because both the lower and the upper levels are more controversial (and more difficult to research and interpret), I will start my discussion of the correlations in the middle-with the representational mind.

The rep-mind, which emerges around age two and predominates consciousness until around age seven, is capable of being aware of others but incapable of taking the role of others. A self identified with the rep-mind would thus be able to react to others but not act in conscious conformity with others; to that extent, it would be a rather self-centered or narcissistic structure, aware of its own tenuous and vulnerable existence but unable to fully comprehend the others who may threaten it, with a consequent concern, above all, for its own self-protection. This is, in my opinion, Maslow's safety needs and Loevinger's self-protective stage.

Since the rep-mind is also still "close to the body" (Piaget's summary of preop thinking)-or still partially identified and involved with emotional-sexual impulses-this general structure, especially in its beginning development, would display Loevinger's stage of "impulsiveness." The impulsive and self-protective stages (or sub-stages, depending on the theorist) correspond to Kohlberg's first two stages of moral development-punishment and obedience (1) and naive instrumental hedonism (2). The point is that, since the rep-mind is still close to the body, the self identified with that mind is likewise close to the body and thus largely motivated by the body-by concerns over bodily pain and punishment (1), or bodily hedonistic pleasure (2). With little or no actual comprehension of others, the overall stage is indeed rightly referred to as self-protective (Loevinger), narcissistic (Freud), egocentric
rule/role mind

With the emergence of the rule/role mind, the capacity to take the role of other emerges. The self identified with the role-mind would thus be keenly attuned to the opinions and roles of others and to its own role in the midst of others. Further, since the role-mind is not yet capable of formal operational thinking, the self would have no inner capacity to easily judge the true roles from the false (or fraudulent) ones. It would thus tend merely to conform to the role assigned it, especially by authority figures. This, in my opinion, in Maslow's belongingness needs, Loevinger's conformist (and conscientious-conformist) stages, and Kohlberg's overall stage of conventional (conformist) morality.

The self identified with the role-mind escapes to some degree its narcissistic imprisonment in its own being and begins to enter the community of other viewpoints. Initially, it is "captured" by those viewpoints-hence conformity. The self actively seeks this conformity because that is now its locus of identification, preservation, and life-to lose conformity is to "die." To lose face, to be an outsider, to not belong-there is the terror of the self identified with the role-mind.

formal-reflexive mind

By adolescence, the formal-reflexive mind begins to emerge. This level is the first structure clearly capable of sustained self-reflection and introspection. The self identified with the reflexive mind would thus be involved in conscientious and self-inquiring modes of awareness and behavior. It would have the capacity to question conventional mores (something the role-mind could not easily do) and would thus be involved in postconventional moral decisions. No longer bound to conformity needs, the self would have to rely more on its own conscience, or its inner capacity to formally reflect and establish rationally what might be the good, the true, and the beautiful, at least in its own case. Above all, it would have to see itself succeeding in-or at least attempting this task, since it is now identified with the processes of self-reflection. Its "life" is now a process of self-reflection in the midst of other self-reflecting persons, and how it succeeds in this venture of self-reflection largely determines its own inner feelings of worth.

In my opinion, this is exactly Maslow's stage of self-esteem, Loevinger's conscientious and individualistic stage(s), and Kohlberg's postconventional morality. According to Kohlberg, the postconventional level consists of the stage of "morality by individual rights" (stage 5), and morality of "individual principles of conscience" (stage 6), which are almost
exactly Loewinger's conscientious and individualistic stages, respectively.

We turn now to some of the highest levels of development, and here of course our data begins rapidly to thin out, but enough remains to conclude our general points. If the development of basic structures continues beyond the formal-reflexive mind, then-I have hypothesized-the next major basic structure is that of vision-logic, which was postulated as being the highest personal-integrative level of consciousness. The self identified with this level would thus be expected to attempt to fulfill the highest personal potentials it may possess, as well as to integrate firmly those it has already developed. In my opinion, this is Maslow's stage of self-actualization, and Loewinger's integrated/autonomous stages). (For reasons that Kohlberg's studies "run out" at this point, see Breger, 1974; Loewinger, 1976; it is not that moral sensibility runs out at this stage, but that careful research into moralization has not yet been carried out beyond this stage).

Beyond vision-logic lie the various levels of transpersonal structural organization which, taken as a whole, refer to Maslow's "self-transcendence" (a region usually ignored or denied by orthodox psychologists). The problem with even Maslow's presentation at this point, however, is that it fades out much too quickly. Although of pioneering importance in its day, Maslow's single category ("self-transcendence") slurs over the increasingly obvious notion that there are probably as many discrete stages of development beyond self-esteem as there are stages leading up to it. The transpersonal realm is far from being a structure, but houses, in my opinion, at least five levels, perhaps as many as twelve or more (see Brown, 1977; Coleman, 1977; Wilber, 1980a). I simply include Maslow's highest need (self-transcendence) to finish our correlations. As research is expanded and refined, I think the existence of these higher dozen or so transpersonal levels-their characteristics, their development, and their moral correlates (such as the Bodhisattva vow)-will become more obvious.

As for the very lowest levels, I do not think it necessary-or yet possible-to put the case as forcefully as I have for the middle realms. The reason is obvious: the lowest levels (up to and including the phantasmic) are preverbal; thus research is extremely difficult to conduct and even more difficult to interpret, and I in no way wish to hang my case on wild speculations about the first one or two years of infancy. I will simply say that, in my opinion, the studies of Fairbairn (1954), Jacobson (1964), Spitz (1965), Mahler (1975), and Piaget (1977) are definitely amenable to the theory I am here presenting. As for

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Loevinger's lowest levels (autistic, symbiotic, and beginning impulsive), I have simply listed them next to what I believe are the crucial correlations with the basic structures of consciousness (Kohlberg has no correlations here because he was working solely and deliberately with verbal reports, and these early stages are entirely preverbal). In any event, the lowest stages, as with the highest, are especially awaiting further research.

DISCUSSION

Perhaps we can now better appreciate why the moral-self stages and self-needs can be called "exclusivity structures," and also how and why they differ fundamentally from the basic structures on which they rest. Take as an overall example, the conformity stage(s)-my suggestion is that the actual need to conform (e.g., Maslow/Loevinger) is generated in large part by the attachment to the rule/role mind. Once that attachment is broken (via the phase-specific negation or dis-identification), so is the conformity drive. But the rule/role mind, as a basic structure, is not broken; it can (and should) continue to function, at least as Arieti (1967) describes it, both in gathering its own information/rule-processing data and in serving as an ingredient-operand of the formal mind. And notice, that a person at the rule/role mind has (barring pathology) perfect access to and use of all the preceding and lower basic structures-simultaneous access to the physical body, sensations, perceptions, feelings, images, and representational symbols (words). However, a person at the correlative level of exclusivity needs-in this example, a person at the conformity stage(s) -xioes not have access to, or does not use and simultaneously exercise, the lower replacement structures (because, basically, they no longer exist). A person striving to be a conformist does not simultaneously and equally strive to be an impulsive maverick. As both Loevinger and Kohlberg demonstrated, a person at a given stage of moral self-development rarely gives responses of the lower stages (and the lower or more removed the stage, the less likely the response). Basic structures remain; exclusivity structures are discarded and replaced.

As for using one basic structure, such as the rule/role mind, to generate two stages of self-moral development (e.g., Loevinger's conformist and conscientious-conformist stages, and Kohlberg's stage 3 and 4), there are several possible theoretical explanations and alternatives. The simplest is that future research might disclose more basic structures, thus "evening up" the score. However, I think that is unlikely and theoretically unnecessary. More to the point is Jurgen Habermas' correla-
tion of Piaget’s stages of preop, conop, and formop thinking (our rep-mind, rule/role mind, and formal mind) with Kohlberg’s six stages of moral development, a correlation that is exactly as I have presented in Fig. 3: each basic structure underlies two moral stages (McCarthy, 1978). Habermas suggests that a single cognitive base structure, when subjected to different degrees of "interactive competence," supports two sub-classes of response. Further, this degree of "interactive competence" is related directly to "the core of identity formation." The two subclasses, then, might be two stages in the filling out of the interactive competence contained in potentia in the basic structure itself.

To suggest, i.e., that the basic structures are root supports of various exclusivity or transition structures does not imply that they are not subjected to intermediate operations. This certainly seems the view of Habermas, Selman, and Kohlberg, all of whom tend to see cognitive base structures separated from moralization by interpersonal-self operations. Thus I have already argued (above) that between the basic structures, on the one hand, and the self-moral stages, on the other, lies the self-system and its transcribing operations. Whether this transcription process takes place in one or two stages—indeed, three or four—is an extremely important point, but one that is incidental to my general thesis. At this time, I regard Habermas’ discussion as the most cogent, and therefore it is the one I have here followed.

Finally, a point on Maslow’s needs hierarchy. In my opinion, Maslow’s hierarchy is almost entirely one of transition-replacement structures, not basic structures, of consciousness. I say this because (1) it fits almost perfectly the other schemes of self-stage development, as we have already seen (and as Loevinger emphasized); and (2) it fits very poorly with the traditional maps of basic structures.

Take, for example, the Vedanta kosas or sheaths of consciousness. In order of ascending structuralization, they are: the annamayakosa, or physical (food) level; the pranamayakosa, or emotional-sexual level; the manomayakosa, or level of mental logic; the vijnanamayakosa, or level of intuition; and the anandamayakosa, or level of transcendental enstasis (beyond which lies the selfless being of ultimate spirit, or sahaj Brahman). None of those levels directly represents a self-sense—they are first and foremost levels of consciousness, not modes of self or self-needs. The Vedanta kosas are, in my opinion, perfect examples of basic structures (not exclusivity needs). They correlate precisely, although in condensed fashion, with the scheme presented in Fig. 1, not Fig. 3. The same

*Maslow's needs hierarchy as transition-replacement structures*

*perennial traditions and basic structures*
seems to be true, I would like to emphasize, of the yogic chakras (Hindu or Buddhist), the Mahayana vijnanas, Aurobindo, the Christian mystic hierarchies, and so on (see Guenon, 1945; Suzuki, 1968, Zimmer, 1969; Smith, 1976; Da Free John, 1977; Wilber, 1980a; Aurobindo.)

The perennial traditions are certainly aware of various stage or exclusivity phenomena. The ten Zen ox-herding pictures, for instance, largely depict transition-replacement states of consciousness en route to satori; the Theravadin tradition is very rich in the details of transition structures, as is Vajrayana and Hindu tantras (including also the fact that higher stages usually include spiralling returns to and recapitulations of lower levels, in all sorts of complex patterns and combinations (see, for example, Brown, 1980). My point is rather that, in attempting to integrate and synthesize Eastern and Western approaches (as well as various Western approaches themselves) the differences between basic and replacement structures might be kept in mind lest we end up comparing apples and oranges.

I have suggested that Maslow's hierarchy is basically one of exclusivity structures. The one exception is Maslow's physiological needs, his lowest level, which I have put in parentheses in Fig. 3. One never outgrows the physiological need for food, air, etc. In other words, the physiological needs are not self-stages or transition-stages perse; nor are they prepotent (giving way to subtler needs: the need for air is never replaced, e.g., by the need for safety). But when the self is identified exclusively with the physical body (or physiological needs), which is basically the case in the first year or so of life (Wilber, 1980a), that does indeed generate a set of self-needs or exclusivity structures, which, in my opinion, are pretty much as summarized by Loevinger: the symbiotic-impulsive needs. If the self is identified with food (oral stage), it is also bound to the source of food (the mother)-hence the "symbiotic membrane" (Mahler, 1975). And while it will outgrow the symbiotic need (bar-ring fixation), it will never outgrow the need for food. This is the fundamental difference between basic structures and exclusivity structures. In my opinion, then, Maslow's physiological needs are the only basic structures in his hierarchy; they therefore ought to be replaced with something like the symbiotic or impulsive needs (with the physiological needs moved back to the hierarchy of basic structures). Maslow's list would then be consistently a hierarchy of self-stages-self-symbiosis, self-safety, self-belongingness, self-esteem, self-actualization, self-transcendence—and not physical, emotional, mental, subtle, and causal structures.
One last reason why it is important to distinguish basic structures from exclusivity stages is that the two do not necessarily—not even usually—follow the same developmental timetable. They emerge in the same order, but not necessarily at the same time. The emergence of the basic structures can run far ahead of the self’s willingness to “climb up” them. This, of course, raises many intriguing questions, but they are questions already faced by orthodox developmental psychologists, for it has long been acknowledged that cognitive structures are necessary but not sufficient for moral or self-development. For example, an individual can be at the basic structure of the rule/role mind but display a moral self-sense anywhere at or below it (but never above it, e.g., Breger, 1974). For just that reason, the actual times of emergence of the basic structures (up to and including formop) are largely age-dependent and relatively fixed (as explained, for example, by Piaget’s cognitive structures and as indicated on Fig. 1), but the stages of the exclusivity structures are relatively age-independent (as Loevinger and Kohlberg have explained for their stage-structures). The hypothesis that basic structures serve as substrates for self-stages is compatible with that data.

In short, these distinctions have important implications for orthodox developmental psychology, because, even though rather elemental, they have been largely overlooked, as Flavell (1970) lamented. But they are also important for transpersonal psychologists attempting to integrate and synthesize Eastern and Western approaches to psychology/therapy/meditation, lest mere stages be confused with ontological structures (or vice versa). The dynamic, the timetable, the characteristics—these are all different in the development of the basic structures and the development of the self-sense through these structures. And while the former is the substrate for the latter, the two otherwise constitute different developmental strands.

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